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Corporate Tax Aggressiveness and Managerial Rent Extraction: Evidence from Insider 
Trading 
 
Abstract 
 
Recent studies argue that aggressive forms of tax avoidance can be used to facilitate managerial 
rent extraction from shareholders (e.g., Desai 2004; Desai and Dharmapala 2006; Desai et al. 
2007). Despite this agency view of tax avoidance receiving increasing attention in the literature, 
there is limited empirical evidence that managers actually extract rents generated from tax 
avoidance activities. In this paper, we examine the association between corporate tax 
aggressiveness and managerial rent extraction in the form of insider trading profitability. We 
document that, on average, insider purchase profitability, but not sale profitability, is 
significantly higher in more tax aggressive firms. The positive association between tax 
aggressiveness and insider purchase profitability is attenuated for firms with more effective 
monitoring and for firms with better information environments. Finally, we find that tax 
aggressiveness is significantly associated with greater insider sale volume in the fiscal year prior 
to a stock price crash. Our study contributes to the literature by providing empirical evidence that 
managers do, in fact, extract insider trading rents through corporate tax aggressiveness 
(Armstrong et al. 2015) and the findings are particularly important in light of the number of 
studies relying on the agency view of tax avoidance to develop arguments or to draw inferences. 
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Corporate Tax Aggressiveness and Managerial Rent Extraction: Evidence from Insider 
Trading 
1. Introduction 
 Recent studies argue that aggressive forms of tax avoidance can be used to facilitate 
managerial rent extraction from shareholders (e.g., Desai 2004; Desai and Dharmapala 2006; 
Desai et al. 2007). Despite this agency view gaining increasing attention in the literature and 
many studies relying on it to either develop arguments or draw inferences (e.g., Hanlon and 
Slemrod 2009; Desai and Dharmapala 2009; Chen et al. 2010; Kim et al. 2011; Goh et al. 2013 
etc.), whether managers make use of tax avoidance activities to extract rents from shareholders 
and the mechanisms through which they do so are unclear and not well-established. As 
Armstrong et al. (2015, p.3) note, “their (Desai and Dharmapala 2006) model assumes that 
managers can extract rents generated by tax avoidance because operational complexity (and the 
accompanying information asymmetry) results in a more opaque information environment and 
therefore lowers the cost and expands the scope for rent extraction. However, Gallemore and 
Labro (2014) find that tax avoidance is associated with higher quality (internal) information 
environments and the precise channels through which managers extract (or personally benefit 
from) the rents that are generated from tax avoidance are not clear. Moreover, there is limited 
empirical evidence that managers do, in fact, extract rents that are generated by tax avoidance.” 
The objective of this study is to provide large sample evidence on the association between 
corporate tax aggressiveness and managerial rent extraction in the form of managerial insider 
trading profitability.  
Although there are many ways in which managers can extract rent from shareholders 
(e.g., investing in pet projects, perks consumption, shirking, living the quite life, etc.), we focus 
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on managers’ informed insider trading because these are more observable and can be measured 
easily for a broad sample of U.S. firms, due to SEC requirements that firms report insider trading 
activities on SEC Forms 3, 4, and 5. Because insiders profit at the expense of shareholders when 
trading their firms’ shares based on their private information, much of the prior literature in 
accounting, finance and law argue that informed insider trading is undesirable (e.g., Seyhun 
1986; Ausubel 1990; Fishman and Hagerty 1992; Fried 1996; Lakonishok and Lee 2001). 
Specifically, when insiders trade on their privileged information, it redistributes wealth from 
outsiders to insiders, reduces the willingness of outside investors to participate in equity 
ownership, undermines public confidence in the stock markets, and increases the firm’s cost of 
equity capital. Furthermore, insider trading is socially undesirable based on the intuition that it is 
unfair for corporate insiders to trade on their private information with those that do not have 
access to such information.
1
 
In this study, we argue that an association can exist between aggressive tax avoidance 
and insider trading profitability. On the one hand, firms that aggressively pursue tax savings have 
incentives to invest in high quality management accounting systems in order to identify tax 
opportunities, coordinate tax planning across business segments, and reduce uncertainty about 
the payoffs of tax planning strategies (Gallemore and Labro 2014). On the other hand, the 
agency view of tax avoidance proposed by Desai and Dharmapala (2006) suggests that the 
increased opacity from complex tax transactions can provide managers with the tools, masks, 
                                                          
1
 Some studies (e.g., Manne 1966; Carlton and Fischel 1983) however contend that insider trading promotes market 
efficiency by enabling the market price of the affected security to move toward the price that the security would 
command if the inside information were publicly available. In addition, Manne (1966) argues that insider trading 
profits represent the most efficient means of compensating entrepreneurs and incentivizes them to produce more 
innovations. Consistent with this argument, Roulstone (2003) find that firms that restrict insider trading pay a 
premium in total compensation relative to firms that do not restrict insider trading.  
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and justifications for rent extraction and other resource-diverting activities.
2
 Hence, self-serving 
managers can still reduce the quality of the externally reported financial information despite the 
firm having a high quality internal information environment. To the extent that tax aggressive 
activities are opportunistic and self-serving, and insiders are able to use complex structured 
transactions underlying tax planning to inflate reported earnings and stock price for an extended 
period of time, we expect insiders to exploit the corporate opacity arising from tax avoidance 
activities to profit from purchasing the company shares. This line of reasoning suggests we 
should observe the profitability of insider trading purchases to increase with a firm’s tax 
aggressiveness.  
It is ex ante not clear how the profitability of insider sales is associated with a firm’s tax 
aggressiveness. Managers may not have incentives to sell the company shares unless the 
concealment of the true performance of the firm becomes impossible and when stock price is 
about to crash (e.g., Kim et al. 2011). Furthermore, prior literature suggests that insider sale 
transactions are generally less informative than insider purchase transactions because insiders 
sell for other reasons such as diversification or portfolio rebalancing and for liquidity needs 
(Ofek and Yermack 2000). Also, there are costs in the form of higher litigation risk involved in 
insider sale transactions (Cheng and Lo 2006; Johnson et al. 2007), which may deter insiders in 
tax aggressive firms from engaging in informed insider sales. Hence, how the profitability of 
insider sales is associated with a firm’s tax aggressiveness is an empirical question. 
Following prior studies (e.g., Huddart and Ke 2007; Skaife et al. 2013), we define the 
profitability of insider trading as the gains after purchases and the losses avoided by selling 
shares. If insiders’ trades reflect information already impounded in stock prices, the average 
                                                          
2
 For example, Desai (2004) provides anecdotal examples of high profile cases of tax avoidance – at Enron, Tyco 
and Xerox – that reveal how the incentive to improve reported profits fosters tax avoidance activities and how the 
corresponding drive to avoid taxes gives rise to the manipulation of accounting profits and managerial malfeasance. 
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insider trading profits should be zero. In contrast, insider trading profits will be positive when 
managers trade on their private information. Consistent with Frank et al. (2009), we characterize 
tax aggressiveness as reflecting a broad range of activities that would not necessarily be deemed 
as inappropriate by the tax authorities, but reflecting increasing degree of tax aggressiveness the 
more a firm utilizes them (e.g., transfer pricing arrangements, location of intangible property in 
low-tax locations, utilization of flow-through entities in structured transactions, tax shelter 
transactions, etc.). Following prior studies (e.g., Kim et al. 2011; Rego and Wilson 2012), we use 
several measures of tax aggressiveness to triangulate our inferences: (1) cash effective tax rate, 
(2) total book-tax differences, (3) discretionary book-tax difference based on Frank et al. (2009) 
and (4) tax shelter prediction score based on Wilson (2009).  
Using a large sample of firms from fiscal years 1995–2010 and controlling for factors 
associated with insider trading, we find that insider trading purchase profits are significantly 
higher in more tax aggressive firms. This result is consistent with insiders opportunistically 
exploiting the information advantage arising from tax aggressive activities to profitably purchase 
their company shares. In contrast, we do not find that insider trading sale profits are significantly 
higher in more tax aggressive firms. To further corroborate our analyses we examine whether the 
association between tax aggressiveness and insider trading profitability is weaker for firms that 
exert more effective monitoring over insiders. In addition, because Gallemore and Labro (2014) 
argue that tax aggressive firms have incentives to invest in high quality management accounting 
systems, we examine whether a better information environment arising from tax avoidance 
activities limits the ability of insiders to take advantage of the opacity associated with tax 
aggressiveness to extract rent from insider trading. We proxy for the effectiveness of monitoring 
using institutional ownership, and proxy for the quality of the firm’s information environment 
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using the number of analyst following and bid-ask spread. Consistent with our expectations, we 
find that the positive association between tax aggressiveness and the profitability of insider 
purchases is attenuated for firms with greater institutional ownership, greater analyst following, 
and lower bid-ask spreads.  
Next, we separately examine the profitability of inside trades by insider types: 1) CEOs 
and CFOs; 2) other officers and; 3) non-officer directors. We find that all insiders, including 
supposedly less informed non-officer directors, are also able to profitably purchase in firms with 
higher tax aggressiveness. The result that non-officer directors are also able trade profitably is 
consistent with that documented by Ravina and Sapienza (2010), who find that independent 
directors are able to trade almost as profitably as other executives. Overall, the results suggest 
that the opacity and agency problems surrounding tax aggressiveness permeate the entire firm 
such that all insiders are able to profit from their purchases. 
Prior work (e.g., Bettis et al. 2000; Roulstone 2003; Jagolinzer et al. 2011) highlights that 
many firms restrict their insiders from trading during periods before quarterly earnings 
announcements. These periods are where information asymmetry is presumably higher before 
earnings disclosure and hence the restriction limits insiders’ ability to trade on private 
information about the upcoming earnings news. Despite these restrictions, Jagolinzer et al. 
(2011) document that about 24% of all insider trades occur within restricted trade windows, and 
that these trades are more profitable than those outside restricted trade windows. Given the 
increased complexity and opacity associated with tax aggressive activities, we investigate 
whether insiders of tax aggressive firms are more likely to time their trades during restricted 
trading windows (defined as the window beginning with 46 days prior to earnings announcement 
and ending one-day after announcement following Jagolinzer et al. 2011). We find a positive 
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association between tax aggressiveness and insider purchase profitability during these restricted 
trading windows but fail to find such association outside the restricted trading windows. This 
finding suggests that insiders of tax aggressive firms are able to trade more profitably because 
they time their trades strategically during periods of high information asymmetry before earnings 
announcement.  
One reason we fail to find that insiders of tax aggressive firms are able to trade more 
profitably from sales transactions could be that insider sale transactions are generally less 
informative because insiders sell for other reasons such as diversification or portfolio rebalancing 
and for liquidity needs (Ofek and Yermack 2000). Following Ravina and Sapienza (2010), we 
explore a setting where insider sale transactions are more likely to be information-driven to 
examine whether insiders of tax aggressive firms are able to trade more profitably from their sale 
transactions. Given Kim et al.’s (2011) finding that tax avoidance facilitates bad news hoarding 
activities for extended periods, leading to stock price crashes when the accumulated hidden bad 
news crosses a tipping point, we investigate whether tax aggressiveness is associated with greater 
trading intensity in the period prior to stock price crashes.
3
 Consistent with our expectations, we 
find that tax aggressiveness is significantly associated with greater insider sale volume in the 
fiscal year prior to the crash.
4
 This result provides some evidence that insiders of tax aggressive 
firms trade opportunistically to avoid losses prior to stock price crashes. 
We conduct several additional analyses to test the robustness of our results. First, we find 
that our results are robust to using two alternative measures of tax aggressiveness: the long-run 
                                                          
3 Following prior work (Hutton et al. 2009; Kim et al. 2011), we define a crash in a given specific year for a given 
firm as a week during which the firm experiences firm-specific weekly returns 3.09 standard deviations below the 
mean firm-specific weekly returns over the entire fiscal year. 
4 We examine volume instead of profit because of the potential mechanical relationship between future stock price 
crashes and lower insider trading profitability – recall that our measure of insider trading profitability is the 
summation of one-year ahead individual trades, which overlaps with the period where the stock price crash occurs. 
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cash effective tax rate developed by Dyreng et al. (2008) and the residual book-tax difference 
based on Desai and Dharmapala (2006). Second, to mitigate the concerns that the association 
between tax aggressiveness and insider trading profitability is merely driven by previously 
documented effects of accruals on insiders’ trading (e.g., Beneish and Vargus 2002; Bartov and 
Mohanram 2004), we further control for discretionary accruals based on the cross-sectional 
Modified Jones (1991) model. Our main results remain unchanged. Finally, Hoi et al. (2013) 
document that firms with excessive irresponsible corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities 
are associated with higher tax avoidance and Gao et al. (2014) find that firms that invest in CSR 
activities are committed to building a positive image of caring for social good and are therefore 
less likely to engage in profitable insider trading. Hence, we include CSR orientation as an 
additional control which results in a much reduced sample. We find that our main inferences 
remain the same.  
Our study contributes to the literature by providing direct empirical evidence that 
managers do, in fact, extract rents through tax aggressiveness (Armstrong et al. 2015) and we 
document one mechanism through which managers extract rents from tax aggressiveness - that 
is, via insider trading. However, we caution that we only find evidence of significant insider 
purchase profits on average, presumably because information-driven insider sales are more 
difficult to observe generally. Nonetheless, we do find evidence of greater insider sale volume in 
the period prior to stock price crashes, which is a more powerful setting where insider sale 
transactions are more likely to be information-driven. Our finding is particularly important in 
light of the substantial amount of studies that rely on this agency argument to develop their 
hypothesis (e.g., Chen et al. 2010; Kim et al. 2011; Goh et al. 2013). 
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The remainder of our paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we discuss the 
findings in related literature and develop our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and our 
research methodology. We present and discuss the results in Section 4.  Section 5 reports 
additional analyses and sensitivity tests and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Related Literature and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Agency view of corporate tax avoidance 
Firms have incentives to reduce their tax burden through tax planning because the 
incurrence of income taxes is a substantial expense for firms and the payment of income taxes 
can reduce the cash available for reinvestment, growth, and shareholders. Notwithstanding the 
cash savings benefit of tax avoidance behavior, it can be a potentially costly activity to 
shareholders. Aggressive tax planning requires complex structuring of transactions such as 
transfer pricing, allocation of debt and earnings stripping, creating hybrid entities or instruments, 
setting up offshore intellectual property havens, and centralizing operating activities in tax-
friendly jurisdictions to minimize the overall corporate tax burden.
5
 These tax planning 
arrangements are likely to increase organizational complexity and financial opacity, making it 
more difficult for outsiders to interpret the source and persistence of the firm’s earnings and cash 
flows and thus lead to reduced corporate transparency (e.g., Bushman et al. 2004; Balakrishnan 
et al. 2013). To the extent that this greater complexity cannot be adequately communicated to 
outside parties, such as equity investors, creditors, and analysts, transparency problems can arise. 
Consistent with this line of reasoning, Balakrishnan et al. (2013) find positive associations 
                                                          
5
 For example, some corporations take advantage of tax breaks and/or tax holidays offered in certain countries (such 
as Ireland, Singapore and Vietnam) to centralize their regional administrative, research and development, 
manufacturing or logistics function to reduce overall tax burden and to reap economies of scale in these operating 
activities. 
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between tax avoidance (proxied by the firm’s effective tax rates) and measures of information 
uncertainty, information asymmetry and earnings quality. Kim et al. (2011) find that a firm’s 
stock price crash risk increases with tax aggressiveness and Frank et al. (2009) find a strong 
positive relation between aggressive tax and financial reporting.
6
  
Under the agency view of tax avoidance, the increased opacity from complex tax 
transactions can provide managers with the tools, masks, and justifications for rent extraction 
and other resource-diverting activities (e.g., Desai 2004; Desai and Dharmapala 2006; Desai et 
al. 2007). Desai and Dharmapala (2006) develop a model that presumes that management can 
extract rents derived under the guise of tax avoidance, in part, because tax avoidance increases 
firm operational complexity. In empirical tests, they find that higher incentive compensation is 
associated with lower tax avoidance, and this negative effect is driven primarily by firms with 
weaker governance.
7
 The authors interpret their evidence as consistent with agency costs 
diminishing the benefits of corporate tax avoidance to shareholders. Consistent with this notion, 
Desai et al. (2007) find that firms experience an increase in market value after an increase in 
targeted tax enforcement in Russia. This result suggests that even though tax avoidance activities 
save investors cash, investors are aware of the potential managerial self-dealing and react 
favorably to regulatory actions that prevent managers from transferring corporate resources 
under the cover of or through tax transactions. Hence, these papers suggest that tax avoidance 
can exacerbate the agency problems between the firm and its shareholders.  
Many studies in finance and accounting motivate hypotheses or develop arguments based 
on the underlying assumption of this agency view of tax avoidance. For instance, Chen et al. 
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 In contrast, Lennox et al. (2013) find that tax avoidance firms are less likely to commit accounting fraud, an 
extreme form of earnings management. 
7
 Desai and Dharmapala (2006) measure incentive compensation using the value of stock option grants as a fraction 
of total compensation of all the firm’s managers.  
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(2010) argue that family owners are willing to forgo tax benefits to avoid the non-tax cost of a 
potential stock price discount, which can arise from minority shareholders’ concern with family 
rent-seeking masked by tax avoidance activities. Consistent with their expectation, they find that 
family firms are less tax aggressive than their non-family counterparts. Kim et al. (2011) argue 
that tax avoidance facilitates managerial rent extraction and bad news hoarding activities for 
extended periods by providing tools, masks, and justifications for these opportunistic behaviors. 
The hoarding and accumulation of bad news for extended periods lead to stock price crashes 
when the accumulated hidden bad news crosses a tipping point, and is then released all at once. 
Consistent with their prediction, they find strong and robust evidence that corporate tax 
avoidance is positively associated with firm-specific stock price crash risk. Goh et al. (2013) 
argue that under this agency view of tax aggressiveness, managers have incentives to conceal 
their opportunistic behavior from the investigations of auditors and investors by maintaining the 
complexity and opacity of tax avoidance activities.
8
 This increased opacity makes it harder for 
auditors to uncover any accounting irregularities embedded within these tax avoidance activities. 
Moreover, the agency problems embedded within tax avoidance activities can cause a serious 
breakdown in auditor-client relationship, making it harder for auditors to peacefully remediate 
the problems without conflict with managers. Consistent with this line of reasoning, they find a 
positive relation between tax aggressiveness and the likelihood of auditor resignation.  
Despite the agency view of tax avoidance being widely cited in the finance and 
accounting literature, the mechanism through which managers extract rents from tax aggressive 
activities remains unclear and there is limited empirical evidence that managers do, in fact, 
extract rents through tax avoidance (Armstrong et al. 2015). An exception is Blaylock (2014) 
                                                          
8
 Consistent with the arguments in Goh et al. (2013), Donohoe and Knechel (2014) document an audit fee premium 
attributable to tax aggressiveness that is incremental to premiums relating to an auditor’s general concerns about 
earnings management via the tax accounts. 
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who tests for large sample evidence whether tax avoidance is associated with economically 
significant managerial rent extraction from shareholders in the U.S. However, he is unable to 
find evidence that tax avoidance is related to managerial rent extraction based on three proxies 
for managerial opportunism: low relative future performance, overinvestment, and low relative 
payouts to common shareholders. Blaylock (2014) concludes that researchers should exercise 
care when making predictions that assume a relation between tax avoidance and rent extraction 
by carefully considering how appropriate this theory is for the firms in their sample. 
 
2.2 Corporate tax aggressiveness and insider trading 
In this study, we examine whether tax aggressiveness is associated with managerial rent 
extraction in the form of insider trading profitability. Prior studies suggest that there can be more 
profitable insider trading opportunities as the degree of information asymmetry increases. For 
instance, Kyle (1985) demonstrates the positive relation between insiders’ profits and insiders’ 
informational advantage in his analytical model. Consistent with this line of reasoning, Aboody 
and Lev (2000) find that insider trading profit is higher in firms with greater information 
asymmetry, captured by greater research and development (R&D) expenditure.  Seyhun (1998) 
and Lakonishok and Lee (2001) document that insider trading in smaller firms predict future 
returns but that insider trading in large firms do not.  Finally, using analyst following as a proxy 
for information asymmetry, Frankel and Li (2004) find that analyst following is negatively 
associated with the frequency of insider trading.  
Because tax aggressive activities involve complicated structuring of business 
transactions, operational complexity (and the accompanying information asymmetry) increases, 
it is harder for outsiders to interpret the source and persistence of the firm’s earnings and cash 
12 
 
flows (Balakrishnan et al. 2013). Hence, there is a greater likelihood that insiders possess private 
information that is not available to outsiders. Furthermore, under the agency view that complex 
tax avoidance strategies afford opportunities for managerial resource diversion, we expect 
insiders in tax aggressive firms to be more likely to exploit this information advantage to 
profitably trade in their firms’ shares.  
To illustrate, Desai (2004) provides anecdotal examples of three high profile cases of tax 
avoidance – at Enron, Tyco and Xerox – that reveal how active tax management strategies can 
serve to advance the private interests of managers in ways that do not serve the shareholders. In 
the case of Enron, management made use of the tax department to devise transactions that 
increase financial accounting income. The web of transactions that are embedded within the 
complex tax arrangements enabled Enron to maintain high reported earnings during 1996-1999, 
thereby driving up the firm’s stock price. Tyco’s management employed several tax-
minimization efforts such as corporate inversion, using a web of intercompany loans to relocate 
profits, and a web of affiliates in tax haven countries that served as a destination for pretax 
profits from around the world. Although such efforts allowed Tyco to manufacture post-tax 
profits during 1997-2002 and divert funds without damaging the reported operating performance, 
the same tax haven subsidiaries that shielded Tyco’s profits facilitated managerial concealment 
of insider trading, because of the bank secrecy policies in these jurisdictions.
9
 In the case of 
                                                          
9
 The exact vehicles employed to accomplish corporate tax avoidance were directly used by Kozlowski and Swartz 
to obscure their dealings from shareholders. Specifically, the sales of Tyco stock by CEO Dennis Kozlowski and 
CFO Mark Swartz during Tyco’s 2001 fiscal year amounted to more than $100 million. The link to the corporate tax 
avoidance strategies employed by Tyco stems from the fact that “Kozlowski and Swartz made a significant portion 
of those sales to Tyco subsidiaries based in bank secrecy jurisdictions such as the Jersey Islands and the Bahamas. 
Because of that unusual characteristic of the sales made by Kozlowski and Swartz, they were able to conceal those 
sales from investors until year-end, a fact that advanced the ability of Kozlowski and Swartz to conceal their 
fraudulent conduct from investors.” The same offshore subsidiaries that shielded Tyco’s corporate profits facilitated 
the concealment of insider sales by managers.  But of course we are looking at publicly available records of insider 
trading (SEC Form 4) and hence our tests are not designed to examine concealed insider trading such as the Tyco 
case. 
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Xerox, executives overstated $2.1 billion in revenues and $1.4 billion in net income from 1997 to 
2000 by opportunistically recharacterizing the timing of various transactions, particular leasing 
transactions, and opportunistically recognizing earnings, including a payment from the IRS, 
when threshold levels of earnings and revenues were within reach. The timing of these 
mischaracterizations coincided with an acceleration in compensation for the CEO of Xerox, 
largely through exercises of stock options. 
Although the above examples are highly stylized, they illustrate how companies are able 
to sustain high profits and/or stock price for a relatively extended period of time before the 
eventual revelation of the true underlying firm performance and corporate malfeasance. To the 
extent that tax aggressive activities are opportunistic and self-serving, and insiders can continue 
to use complex structured transactions originating from tax planning to inflate reported earnings 
and stock price, we expect insiders to exploit the corporate opacity arising from tax aggressive 
activities to profit from purchasing the company shares. This line of reasoning suggests we 
should observe the profitability of insider trading purchases to increase with a firm’s tax 
aggressiveness.  
On the other hand, it is ex ante not clear how the profitability of insider sales is associated 
with a firm’s tax aggressiveness. Managers may not have incentives to sell the company shares 
unless the concealment of the true performance of the firm becomes increasing difficult and 
when stock price is about to crash (e.g., Kim et al. 2011). Furthermore, prior literature suggests 
that insider sale transactions are generally less informative than insider purchase transactions 
because insiders sell for other reasons such as diversification or portfolio rebalancing and for 
14 
 
liquidity needs (Ofek and Yermack 2000).
10
 There are also high costs involved in insider sale 
transactions. For instance, Cheng and Lo (2006) find that shareholders are more likely hurt when 
insiders sell shares based on bad news private information rather than when they purchase shares 
based on good news private information. Johnson et al. (2007) find a significantly greater 
correlation between litigation and abnormal insider selling after the adoption of the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act in 1995, which presumably raised the barriers to frivolous 
lawsuits and in turn leads plaintiffs to file lawsuits based on objective evidence such as abnormal 
insider sales. Thus, insiders in tax aggressive firms could be concerned with the increased 
organizational complexity and financial opacity induced by aggressive tax planning, which can 
exacerbate the litigation risks insiders face when they engage in insiders sale transactions.  
Based on the above discussion, we thus structure our hypothesis on how tax 
aggressiveness is linked to the profitability of insider purchases and insider sales separately as 
follows: 
H1: Ceteris paribus, firms’ tax aggressiveness is positively (not) associated with the profitability 
of insider purchases (sales) activities.  
 
2.3 Cross-sectional analyses 
2.3.1 Exploring the effect of monitoring 
Desai and Dharmapala (2006) find that the effect of tax avoidance-induced agency risk is 
more severe in firms with poor corporate governance. Accordingly, if insider trading profits are 
induced in part by the agency problems embedded within the tax avoidance activities, we expect 
that effective monitoring can reduce the extent of managerial rent extraction and opportunistic 
                                                          
10
 Lakonishok and Lee (2001, p. 98) aptly explain the informativeness of insider purchase and sale transactions as 
follows: “(t)here can be a variety of reasons for insiders to sell a stock, but the main reason to buy a stock has to be 
to make money.” 
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insider trading of tax aggressive firms. Consistent with this notion, Jagolinzer et al. (2011) find 
that insider trading restrictions imposed and monitored by the corporate general counsel can 
effectively limit the profitability of insider trading. Chen et al. (2010) find that family firms with 
effective outside monitoring are more tax aggressive than otherwise, presumably because 
effective outside monitoring mitigates managerial rent extraction. Therefore, we expect the 
association between tax aggressiveness and the profitability of insider trading to be weaker for 
firms that exert more effective monitoring over insiders. Our first cross-sectional hypothesis is 
presented as follows: 
H2a: Ceteris paribus, the positive association between firms’ tax aggressiveness and the 
profitability of insider purchases (profitability of insider sales if any) is weaker for firms that 
have more effective monitoring over insiders. 
 
2.3.2 Exploring the effect of information environment 
 Gallemore and Labro (2014) argue that aggressive or complex tax planning requires a 
high quality internal information environment. Specifically, without good information, tax 
planning opportunities may not be visible, coordination of tax planning across business or 
geographic segments may be difficult, and the firm’s documentation may not constitute 
acceptable proof to the IRS. Hence, firms that aggressively pursue tax savings have incentives to 
invest in high quality management accounting systems which allows a firm to obtain a high 
quality internal information environment. Consistent with their arguments, the authors document 
a positive association between tax avoidance and proxies for the firm’s internal information 
environment. To the extent that this better accounting and/or information environment facilitates 
the flow of credible information from insiders to outsiders, agency problems can be mitigated 
16 
 
and the likelihood of misappropriation by managers declines (Lambert et al. 2007).
11
 Under this 
view, we expect the better information environment arising from tax avoidance activities to 
mitigate the managerial resource diversion associated with tax aggressiveness. Hence, we predict 
the positive association between tax aggressiveness and the profitability of insider trades to be 
weaker for firms with better information environment. Our second cross-sectional hypothesis is 
presented as follows: 
H2b: Ceteris paribus, the positive association between firms’ tax aggressiveness and 
profitability of insider purchases (profitability of insider sales if any) is weaker for firms with 
better information environment. 
 
3. Research Design 
3.1 Measure of insider trading profitability 
 We define insider trading profitability as the (unrealized) gains after purchases and losses 
avoided from sales. The profit from insider trading over a particular time period is determined 
by: 1) the returns after each transaction; 2) the dollar value of each transaction and; 3) the 
frequency of these transactions. We choose to focus on a measure that incorporates all three 
determinants of insider trading profitability because examining only a subset of these 
determinants may ignore the importance of other determinant(s) in contributing to overall 
profitability of insider trading over the time period. For example, focusing solely on returns 
ignores the magnitude of the trade, and focusing solely on trading intensity ignores the predictive 
ability of insider trades with respect to future stock returns. Therefore, we follow prior studies 
                                                          
11
 Consistent with this argument, Skaife et al. (2013) find that the profitability of insider trading is larger for firms 
with material weaknesses in internal control (i.e., less reliable financial reporting). 
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(e.g., Huddart and Ke 2007; Skaife et al. 2013) and use a summary measure of insider trading 
profitability at the firm-year level in our empirical tests.   
To construct our measure, we first aggregate all trading transactions made by insiders of 
the same firm on the same day and treat multiple transactions made on the same firm-day as a 
single transaction. We then compute the one-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns (size-adjusted) 
for the period beginning one day after the transaction date.
12
 The gain realized from purchases is 
then computed by multiplying the abnormal return by the dollar value traded. The gain realized 
from sales is computed analogously and then multiplied by minus one so that losses avoided on 
sales have the same sign as gains on purchases. Finally, we aggregate individual transactions at 
the firm-year level to arrive at an aggregate profitability measure of all insider trades (sales or 
purchases) during the fiscal year: 
             
∑          
 
                    
      
 
 
where INS_PROFITit is either insider sale or purchase profitability (SALE_PROFIT and 
PURCH_PROFIT respectively), ABRETitj is equal to the one-year ahead buy-and-hold abnormal 
return computed for the period starting one day after transaction date j, VALUE_TRADEDitj 
equals the total dollar value of shares either sold or purchased by all insiders on day j, n is the 
total number of firm-days with insider sale activity during firm-year it and MVit-1 is the market 
value of equity at the end of fiscal year t-1.
13
 Following Skaife et al. (2013), we multiply the 
                                                          
12
 Section 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 prevents insiders from making short-term opportunistic 
trading by allowing shareholders to recover profits attributable to offsetting purchases and sales that occur within six 
months of each other. As a result, prior work generally finds that insiders trade profitably when trading profits are 
measured over periods of one-year (e.g. Lakonishok and Lee 2001) or even longer (e.g., Ke et al. 2003). Following 
Skaife et al. (2013), we measure insider trading profitability over a one-year period. Results are qualitatively similar 
when we examine three-month, six-month or two-year period returns. 
13
 Following Skaife et al. (2013), we scale our measure of insider trading profitability by the market value of equity 
because the magnitude of insider trade is significantly correlated with firm size. Scaling by firm size alleviate 
concerns that our results are driven by large firms in our sample. 
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insider trading profitability measure by 100 so that this measure is expressed as a percentage of 
MVit-1. 
 Finally, as highlighted by Frankel and Li (2004), insiders are unlikely to trade on their 
private information if they expect the trade to be unprofitable and hence they would refrain from 
trading if they do not possess superior information. Therefore, we follow prior work (Huddart 
and Ke 2007; Skaife et al. 2013) and include firm-years with no reported insider trades and set 
INS_PROFIT equal to zero. 
 
3.2 Measures of tax aggressiveness 
 There is currently no single measure that perfectly captures tax aggressiveness. 
Therefore, we utilize four measures that have been used in various settings in the literature (e.g., 
Kim et al. 2011; Rego and Wilson 2012). Using a variety of measures also increases the 
robustness of our results and mitigates concerns that our measure of tax aggressiveness is merely 
capturing some omitted firm-level characteristic that is unrelated to tax aggressiveness but 
related to insider trading profitability. Our first measure is the cash effective tax rate (CETR), 
defined as cash taxes paid (TXPD) divided by pre-tax income (PI). Following Chen et al. (2010), 
we remove observations with negative pre-tax income, and those observations with CETR below 
zero or above one. We then multiply CETR by minus one so that it is increasing in tax 
aggressiveness. This measure reflects both permanent and temporary book-tax differences. By 
focusing on cash taxes paid, this measure avoids the overstatement of current tax expense due to 
the accounting for the income tax benefits of employee stock options during our pre-SFAS 123R 
sample period (see Hanlon and Shevlin 2002).  
Our second measure is the total book-tax difference (TBTD):  
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 TBTD = TXDI + (STR – ETR)  PI 
where TXDI refers to deferred tax expense, STR refers to the statutory tax rate, ETR refers to the 
effective tax rate (income tax expense divided by pretax income) and PI refers to pretax 
income.
14
 For cross-sectional aggregation purposes, TBTD is scaled by lagged total assets.  
The third measure that we utilize is discretionary permanent book-tax differences (DTAX) 
based on Frank et al. (2009), which is defined as the residuals from the regression of permanent 
differences on several determinants of nondiscretionary permanent differences unrelated to tax 
planning (estimated by year and two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code; firm and 
time subscripts omitted): 
PERMDIFF = α0 + α1(1/ATLAG) + α2INTANG + α3UNCON + α4MI + α5CSTE  
+ α6ΔNOL + α7LAGPERM + ε 
where PERMDIFF refers to total book-tax differences (TBTD) less temporary book-tax-
differences (defined as total deferred tax expense divided by the top statutory tax rate), ATLAG 
refers to lagged total assets (AT), INTANG refers to goodwill and other intangibles (INTAN), 
UNCON refers to income/loss reported under the equity method (ESUB), MI refers to 
income/loss attributable to minority interest (MII), CSTE refers to current state tax expense 
(TXS), ΔNOL refers to the change in net operating loss carry forwards (TLCF) and LAGPERM 
is the lagged PERMDIFF. PERMDIFF, INTANG, UNCON, MI, CSTE and ΔNOL are all scaled 
by lagged total assets.  
 The advantage of using DTAX as a measure of tax aggressiveness is that it captures 
permanent differences that are unrelated to items that are not considered aggressive tax reporting 
                                                          
14
 The usual way to estimate total book tax differences is TBTD = PI – Est TI where PI is pretax book income and 
Est TI is the estimated taxable income = (TXFED + TXFO)/STR.  However this results in measurement error 
because Est TI should be (TXFED/STR + TXFO/Foreign STR). Thus we estimate TBTD = Temp Difference + Perm 
Difference = Deferred tax expense + (STR-ETR)  PI = TXDI + (STR-ETR)  PI per the text. 
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such as state income taxes and tax credits. Also, because prior research suggests that temporary 
book-tax differences reflect pre-tax earnings management via pre-tax accruals (e.g., Philips et al. 
2003), we utilize DTAX to mitigate concerns that our measure of tax aggressiveness is merely 
capturing earnings management.  
 Finally, tax shelters are aggressive tax positions that have little or no business purpose 
and do not subject the firm to any pre-tax economic risk or loss (Treasury 1999). Tax shelters 
generate substantial savings for a firm, but also introduce risk because underlying tax positions 
are unlikely to be sustained upon tax audit. Moreover, tax shelters can involve complicated 
business structures that lead to rent extraction (Desai et al. 2007) or indicate aggressive financial 
reporting practices (Frank et al. 2009) that obscure poor performance or risk associated with the 
firm’s business activities. Hence our last measure of tax aggressiveness is the tax shelter 
prediction score (SHELTER) developed by Wilson (2009) and used in prior literature (e.g., Kim 
et al. 2011; Rego and Wilson 2012), and the specific measurement is described in the Appendix.  
 
3.3 Empirical models 
3.3.1 Main analyses 
To test H1, we estimate the following pooled cross-sectional regression: 
INS_PROFITit = α + βTAXit + ψFIRM_CONTROLSit + IND_FE + εit                                (1) 
where INS_PROFIT refers to either insider sale or purchase profitability (SALE_PROFIT or 
PURCH_PROFIT respectively), TAX refers to the measure of tax aggressiveness (CETR, TBTD,  
DTAX or SHELTER), FIRM_CONTROLS refers to a vector of firm-level controls and IND_FE 
refers to industry fixed-effects. Hypothesis H1 predicts a positive coefficient on TAX. Because 
we conduct our hypothesis testing on a pooled sample, we use firm and year clustered standard 
21 
 
errors to control for time series and cross-sectional dependence in the data (Petersen 2009; Gow 
et al. 2010).  The Appendix includes the detailed definition of all variables. 
 We select FIRM_CONTROLS that are documented in prior literature to be associated 
with insider trading. We control for firm size (lnMV) because Seyhun (1986) and Lakonishok 
and Lee (2001) find that insiders trade more and trade more profitably in small firms, 
respectively. We control for book-to-market (BTM) and prior stock returns (Prior_RET) because 
prior studies suggest that insiders trade as contrarians (Rozeff and Zaman 1998; Piotroski and 
Roulstone 2005; Huddart et al. 2007). Following the findings of prior work (Aboody and Lev 
2000; Frankel and Li 2004; Huddart and Ke 2007), we include various proxies for information 
asymmetry that are known to be associated with insider trading, such as firm age (AGE); R&D 
expenditure (RND), the median absolute abnormal return over past earnings announcements 
(MAG_AR); number of analysts following (ANALYST); institutional ownership (IOHOLD); 
financial statement informativeness (FS_INFORM); and returns volatility (RET_VOL). By 
including these various controls for information asymmetry, the coefficient β captures the 
incremental effect of tax aggressiveness on insider trading profitability, over and above these 
previously documented associations between information asymmetry and insider trading. 
3.3.2 Cross-sectional analyses 
To test H2, we modify equation (1) to include the conditioning variable 
(Conditioning_VAR) and the interaction between TAX and Conditioning_VAR: 
INS_PROFITit = α + βTAXit + ψFIRM_CONTROLSit +γConditioning_VARit  
+ ηTAXit × Conditioning_VARit +  IND_FE + εit                          (2) 
In H2a, we examine the moderating effect of monitoring on the relation between tax 
aggressiveness and insider trading profitability. We focus on the percentage of shares held by 
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institutional investors (IOHOLD) because previous studies (e.g., Grossman and Hart 1980; 
Shleifer and Vishny 1986; Huddart 1993) suggest that large shareholders have incentives to 
undertake monitoring or other costly control activities when the increased returns from such 
monitoring activities are sufficient to cover their associated costs. Chung et al. (2002) find 
evidence that the presence of large institutional shareholdings inhibit managers from managing 
accruals to achieve a desired level of earnings. Parrino et al. (2003) document that institutional 
investors “vote with their feet” and decrease their equity ownership in the year prior to forced 
CEO turnover, which suggests that institutional investors exert monitoring over CEO through 
their ownership. Therefore, we expect firms with higher institutional ownership (IOHOLD) to 
have more effective monitoring over opportunistic insider trading in tax aggressive firms, hence 
weakening the positive association between tax aggressiveness and insider trading profitability.  
In H2b, we examine the moderating effect of information environment on the relation 
between tax aggressiveness and insider trading profitability. We measure the quality of the 
information environment using the number of analysts following (ANALYST) because Frankel 
and Li (2004) find that information collected and disseminated by security analysts reduces 
information asymmetry and limits the ability of insiders to trade profitably based on their private 
information. Analyst following is also interpreted as a measure of information asymmetry by Ho 
et al. (1997) and D’Mello and Ferris (2000). We also use the effective bid-ask spread (SPREAD) 
as an alternative measure because it captures the compensation that less informed market 
participants, such as market makers, demand for the perceived information risk that arises when 
trading with relatively more informed traders such as insiders (Lee et al. 1993, Yohn 1998, Leuz 
and Verrecchia 2000, and Kalimipalli and Warga 2002). We expect firms with more analyst 
following (ANALYST) and lower bid-ask spread (SPREAD) to have better information 
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environment, which reduces the ability of insiders of tax aggressive firms to profit from insider 
trading. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Sample 
 The sample period for the current study spans from 1995-2010.
15
 We collect our financial 
and stock performance data primarily from I/B/E/S, Compustat, and CRSP in computing tax 
aggressiveness, the hypothesized intervening variables and the control variables used in the 
regression analysis. Following prior related studies (e.g., Lakonishok and Lee 2001; Frankel and 
Li 2004), we exclude firms whose stock prices are less than $2 at the beginning of each year to 
avoid unnecessary noise in estimating returns. We collect insider trading transaction data from 
Thomson Reuters, which obtains the data from Form 4 filings with the SEC.
16
 The sample size 
varies for each test because of the specific tax measure used in the test. For example, sample size 
is typically larger when tax aggressiveness is measured by total book-tax-difference (TBTD) or 
discretionary permanent book-tax differences (DTAX), compared to cash effective tax rates 
(CETR) because of the more stringent requirement to compute the latter variable.
17
 We also 
winsorize each continuous variable except the insider trading profitability measure at the 1% and 
99% level to mitigate the effect of outliers. We do not winsorize the profitability measure 
because Kim et al. (2011) find that tax avoiding activities likely lead to a stock price crash in the 
following fiscal year and thus, if we winsorize the profitability measure, we would not be able to 
                                                          
15
 Our sample begins in 1995 because the coverage of insider trading transactions by Thomson Reuter is minimal 
(less than 100 transactions) before 1995. 
16
 Insiders include officers, directors and large shareholders of more than 10% of any equity class of securities of an 
issuing company. For the purpose of this study, we examine only insider trades made by officers classified by 
Thomson-Reuters, which includes CEOs, CFOs, officers, presidents, and vice presidents. In an additional analysis, 
we examine insider trading profitability by insider-type (see section 5.1) 
17
 As mentioned earlier, following Chen et al. (2010), we remove observations with negative pre-tax income, and 
those observations with CETR below zero or above one. 
24 
 
capture insiders’ extreme profit from avoiding crashes. The final sample size used in the 
regression analyses ranges from 30,197 to 45,502 firm-year observations for the 18-year sample 
period. 
 
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
 Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on the regression variables. The mean unscaled 
insider sale profitability (SALE_PROFIT) is -$33,558, which is consistent with prior literature 
that generally finds that insiders do not profit from sales transactions (e.g., Aboody and Lev 
2000; Huddart and Ke 2007; Jagolinzer et al. 2011; Gao et al. 2014). On the other hand, the 
mean unscaled insider purchase profitability (PURCH_PROFIT) is $9,714, which is consistent 
with Lakonishok and Lee (2001) who find that insiders purchase profitably on average, and that 
insiders will not buy if they do not possess superior information (Frankel and Li 2004; Ravina 
and Sapienza 2010).
18
 Insider sale profitability is significantly larger in magnitude as compared 
to insider purchase profitability, and the average annual frequency of insider sales (19.9 
transactions) are also more than the average annual frequency of insider purchases (2.0 
transactions). This reflects greater propensity for insiders to sell their shares and in larger 
amounts in order to diversify the large proportion of their wealth held in their company’s stocks 
received from compensation plans (Ofek and Yermack 2000).   
Turning to our various measures of tax aggressiveness, the mean (median) cash effective 
tax rate (CETR) is 25.6% (25.6%), which is comparable to that reported in another large-sample 
study by Dyreng et al. (2008). The mean (median) total book-tax difference (TBTD) is -0.031 
                                                          
18
 Recall that our measure of insider trading profitability includes firm-year observations for which there are no 
reported insider trades (e.g., Huddart and Ke 2007; Skaife et al. 2013). If we eliminate firm-years with zero sales 
(purchase) transactions, the mean unscaled insider sale (purchase) profitability is -$57,681 ($30,179), and the 
average annual frequency of insider sales (purchase) is 34.2 (6.2) transactions.   
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(0.001) and the mean (median) discretionary permanent book-tax difference (DTAX) is 0.005 
(0.004). These values are comparable to those reported in another large sample study by Frank et 
al. (2009). The mean (median) tax shelter prediction score (SHELTER) is -0.119 (-0.029).    
Table 3 reports the Pearson and Spearman correlation table of the variables in our paper. 
Both Pearson and Spearman correlation between these four measures of tax aggressiveness 
(CETR, TBTD, DTAX and SHELTER) are positive, which suggest that all four measures capture 
aggressive tax planning activities in general. However, the correlations among the four measures, 
between 0.09 to 0.73 for the Pearson correlations, and between 0.08 to 0.61 for the Spearman 
correlations, suggest that each measure likely captures different dimensions of tax aggressiveness 
and hence supports our choice of using all four measures in our analyses to triangulate our results 
and increase the robustness of our findings. The correlation between SALE_PROFIT and all four 
measures of tax aggressiveness are either insignificant (Pearson correlation) or negative and 
significant (Spearman correlation). On the other hand, the correlation between PURCH_PROFIT 
and measures of tax aggressiveness are mostly positive and significant, which is consistent with 
our prediction in H1. Because these are pairwise univariate correlations, we defer the main 
analyses to multivariate tests in section 4.3.  
 
4.3 Main analysis – Test of H1 
In this section, we report our results for the test of H1 which examines the association 
between tax aggressiveness and insider trading profitability. As shown in Table 3, all four 
measures of tax aggressiveness are positively and significantly associated with insider purchase 
profitability (t-statistic = 4.52, 3.57, 3.18 and 3.83 for CETR, TBTD, DTAX and SHELTER, 
respectively). The effect of tax aggressiveness on insider purchase profitability is also 
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economically significant. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in cash effective tax rate 
(CETR), total book-tax difference (TBTD), discretionary permanent book-tax difference (DTAX) 
and tax shelter prediction score (SHELTER) is associated with a 90.0%, 97.3%, 61.7%, and 
157.5% increase in insider purchase profitability, respectively.
19
 On the other hand, we find that 
only one of the tax aggressiveness measures is significantly associated with insider sale 
profitability at the conventional levels (t-statistic = 1.97 for TBTD). The results for insider 
purchase profitability are thus consistent with H1, which predicts that insiders of tax aggressive 
firms take advantage of the opacity surrounding tax planning to increase their profits from their 
insider purchase transactions. The relatively insignificant results for insider sale profitability is 
also consistent with prior literature that finds that insider purchase transactions are generally 
more likely to be information driven (e.g., Lakonishok and Lee 2001; Ravina and Sapienza 2010; 
Jagolinzer et al. 2011) and that insider sale transactions are generally less informative because 
insiders sell for other reasons such as diversification or portfolio rebalancing and for liquidity 
needs (Ofek and Yermack 2000). In a later analysis (section 5.3), we explore a setting (that is, 
the period prior to stock price crashes) where insider sale transactions are more likely to be 
information-driven to examine whether insiders of tax aggressive firms are able to trade more 
profitably from their sale transactions. 
 The coefficients on the other control variables are consistent with prior literature in 
general. In particular, we find that insiders trade as contrarians and earn more profits from sale 
(purchases) when prior returns (Prior_RET) are high (low). We also find that insiders make more 
profits when information asymmetry is high, as proxied by returns volatility (RET_VOL). Next, 
                                                          
19
 The impact of a one standard deviation increase in cash effective tax rate (CETR) on the insider purchase 
profitability (PURCH_PROFIT) is computed as 0.030 (coefficient on CETR) × 0.180 (the sample standard deviation 
of CETR) ÷ 0.006 (the sample mean of PURCH_PROFIT) = 90.0%. The other comparative statics are computed 
analogously. 
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we find that insiders in firms that are older (AGE) earn more profits from sales. Finally, the 
adjusted R
2
 from each model is comparable to that reported in prior studies (e.g., Huddart and Ke 
2007; Skaife et al. 2013). 
 
4.4 Cross-sectional analyses – Test of H2 
 In this section, we explore cross-sectional variation in the relation between tax 
aggressiveness and insider trading profitability. In H2a, we examine the moderating role of 
monitoring. In particular, we argue that stronger monitoring can reduce the extent of managerial 
rent extraction and opportunistic insider trading of tax aggressive firms and hence the positive 
association between tax aggressiveness and insider trading profitability should be weaker for 
firms with stronger monitoring. Table 4 presents the results of this analysis using the percentage 
of institutional ownership (IOHOLD) as a proxy for the extent of monitoring. We find that the 
positive association between tax aggressiveness and insider purchase profitability is weaker for 
firms with higher institutional ownership (t-statistic = -4.12, -2.41, -3.33, and -4.02 for CETR × 
IOHOLD, TBTD × IOHOLD, DTAX × IOHOLD, and SHELTER × IOHOLD, respectively. This 
result is consistent with our prediction in H2a and suggests that stronger institutional monitoring 
mitigate opportunistic trading by insiders of tax aggressive firms and hence limits their ability to 
trade profitably from insider purchases. We fail to find any evidence that institutional ownership 
moderates the association between tax aggressiveness and insider sale profitability. 
In H2b, we examine the moderating role of information environment. We argue that 
firms with better information environment are able to mitigate the private information advantage 
of insiders of tax aggressive firms by reducing the information asymmetry and opacity 
surrounding the tax planning activities as well as facilitating effective governance over 
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managerial rent-seeking behavior. In Tables 5 Panel A and B, we present the results using the 
number of analyst following (ANALYST) and bid-ask spread (SPREAD), respectively, as proxies 
for the quality of the information environment. In Panel A, we find evidence that the positive 
association between tax aggressiveness and insider purchase profitability is weaker for firms 
with more analyst following (t-statistic = -3.92, -2.59, and -2.38 for CETR × ANALYST, DTAX × 
ANALYST, and SHELTER × ANALYST, respectively), although the interaction coefficient is 
negative but insignificant when we examine TBTD.  We fail to find any evidence that analyst 
following moderates the association between tax aggressiveness and insider sale profitability. In 
Panel B, we find that the positive association between tax aggressiveness and insider sale 
profitability is exacerbated for firms with a higher bid-ask spread (t-statistic = 4.77, 2.03, 3.62, 
and 4.69 for CETR × SPREAD, TBTD × SPREAD, DTAX × SPREAD, and SHELTER × 
SPREAD, respectively). On the other hand, there is mixed and inconclusive evidence on how the 
bid-ask spread moderates the association between tax aggressiveness and insider sale 
profitability (t-statistic = 0.78, -2.07, -1.93, and -1.18 for CETR × SPREAD, TBTD × SPREAD, 
DTAX × SPREAD, and SHELTER × SPREAD, respectively. Overall, the results in Tables 5 are 
consistent with a better information environment limiting insiders of tax aggressive firms from 
making more profits from insider purchases, consistent with our prediction in H2b. 
 
5. Additional Analyses and Sensitivity Checks 
5.1 Insider type analysis 
 In our main analyses, we focused on the profitability of insider trades made by officers 
because they are presumed to have broad knowledge of the firm’s tax positions as well as access 
to financial information to form their expectations about the firm’s future prospects prior to their 
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inside trades. In this section, we separately examine the profitability of inside trades by insider 
types: 1) CEOs and CFOs; 2) other officers and; 3) non-officer directors. The purpose of this 
analysis is to shed light on whether only the CEOs and CFOs who have privy to detailed 
financial information have the ability to trade opportunistically, or other less informed insiders 
such as other officers and non-officer directors are able to exploit the opacity and complexity 
surrounding tax avoidance activities to also benefit from their trades. The result of this analysis is 
presented in Table 6. As observed from this table, we find that all insiders, including supposedly 
less informed non-officer directors, are also able to purchase profitably for firms with higher tax 
aggressiveness. On the other hand, there is some weak evidence that only CEOs and CFOs are 
able to sell profitably for firms with higher tax aggressiveness. The result that non-officer 
directors are also able trade profitably is consistent with that documented by Ravina and 
Sapienza (2010), who find that independent directors are able to trade almost as profitably as 
other executives. Overall, the results suggest that the opacity and agency problems surrounding 
tax aggressiveness permeate the entire firm such that all insiders are able to profit from their 
purchases. 
 
5.2 Timing of insider trading during inferred restricted trading windows 
 Earlier, we document that tax aggressiveness is associated with higher insider purchase 
profitability. Here, we investigate the source of insiders’ trading advantage. In particular, we 
examine whether insiders of tax aggressive firms time their trade strategically during periods 
when information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders is high in order to trade more 
profitably. As highlighted by prior work (e.g., Bettis et al. 2000; Roulstone 2003; Jagolinzer et 
al. 2011), many firms restrict their insiders from trading during periods before quarterly earnings 
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announcements, a period where information asymmetry is presumably higher before earnings 
disclosure and hence limits insiders’ ability to trade on private information about the upcoming 
earnings news. Despite these restrictions, Jagolinzer et al. (2011) document that about 24% of all 
insider trades occur within restricted trade windows, and that these trades within restricted trade 
windows are more profitable than those outside restricted trade windows. This result suggests 
that insiders exploit periods of heightened information asymmetry during restricted trade 
windows to trade profitably. We investigate whether insiders of tax aggressive firms are more 
likely to time their trades during restricted trading windows, which results in the higher trading 
profitability that we document. 
 Jagolinzer et al. (2011) find that the average firm in their hand-collected sample with an 
insider trade policy has restricted trading window beginning with 46 days prior to earnings 
announcement and ending one-day after announcement. Hence, we re-examine the relation 
between tax aggressiveness and insider trading profitability during this 48-day restricted trading 
window, and the results are presented in Table 7 Panel A. As observed from this table, tax 
aggressiveness is significantly associated with higher insider purchase profitability during the 
restricted trading windows (with the exception for DTAX, which is positive but insignificant), 
though only DTAX is significantly associated with higher insider sale profitability. On the other 
hand, when we examine the association between tax aggressiveness and insider trading 
profitability outside this restricted window (Table 7 Panel B), only one of the coefficients of tax 
aggressiveness is marginally significant (t-statistic = 1.86 for TBTD when examining insider 
purchase profitability). Overall, these results suggest that insiders of tax aggressive firms are able 
to trade more profitably because they time their trades strategically during periods of high 
information asymmetry before earnings announcement.  
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5.3 Insider trading intensity prior to firm-specific stock price crashes 
In our earlier findings, we generally find that insiders of tax aggressive firms are able to 
trade more profitably for purchases but not for sales. As discussed earlier, this result is consistent 
with prior literature that finds that insider purchase transactions are generally more likely to be 
information driven (e.g., Ravina and Sapienza 2010; Jagolinzer et al. 2011) and that insider sale 
transactions are generally less informative because insiders sell for other reasons such as 
diversification or portfolio rebalancing and for liquidity needs (Ofek and Yermack 2000). 
Therefore, it may explain why we do not find that insiders of tax aggressive firms are able to 
exploit the opacity and their information advantage to trade more profitably from sales. In this 
section, we follow Ravina and Sapienza (2010) and explore a setting where insider sale 
transactions are more likely to be information-driven to examine whether insiders of tax 
aggressive firms are able to trade more profitably from their sale transactions. 
As mentioned earlier, Kim et al. (2011) argue that tax avoidance facilitates managerial 
rent extraction and bad news hoarding activities for extended periods, leading to stock price 
crashes when the accumulated hidden bad news crosses a tipping point, and is then released all at 
once. If tax avoidance activities are opportunistic, managers are likely to be aware of any “bad 
news” hidden within the tax avoidance framework and dispose of their shares before future stock 
price crashes. Hence, we investigate whether tax aggressiveness is associated with greater 
trading intensity (PURCH_VOL and SALE_VOL) in the period prior to stock price crashes.
20
  
Following prior work (Hutton et al. 2009; Kim et al. 2011), we define a crash in a given 
                                                          
20 We examine insider trading volume instead of trading profit in this set of analysis because of the potential 
mechanical relationship between future stock price crashes and lower insider trading profitability - recall that our 
measure of insider trading profitability is the summation of one-year ahead individual trades, which overlaps with 
the period where the stock price crash occurs. 
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specific year for a given firm as a week during which the firm experiences firm-specific weekly 
returns 3.09 standard deviations below the mean firm-specific weekly returns over the entire 
fiscal year,
21
 where the firm-specific weekly returns are estimated based on the residual return 
from the expanded market model.
22
 For firms which experience crashes in a particular fiscal 
year, we examine whether tax aggressiveness is associated with insider trading intensity in the 
prior fiscal year before the crash-year.  
The results are presented in Table 8. We find that tax aggressiveness is significantly 
associated with greater insider sale volume in the fiscal year prior to the crash (with the 
exception for DTAX, which is positive but insignificant). On the other hand, we only find that tax 
aggressiveness is significantly associated with lower insider purchase volume in the fiscal year 
prior to the crash when we examine CETR as a proxy for tax aggressiveness. The overall results 
suggest that insiders of tax aggressive firms trade opportunistically to avoid losses prior to stock 
price crashes. 
 
5.4 Robustness Checks 
5.4.1 Alternative measures of tax aggressiveness 
We test the robustness of our results using two alternative measures of tax aggressiveness. 
The first measure is the long-run cash effective tax rate (CETR5) developed by Dyreng et al. 
(2008): 
CETR5 = -1 × [Five-year sum of cash taxes paid (TXPD)/(five-year sum of pretax income (PI) 
            less special items (SPI))] 
                                                          
21
 3.09 standard deviations is chosen so that to generate a frequency of 0.1% in the normal distribution. 
22
 In particular, the firm-specific weekly return, denoted by W, is defined as the natural log of one plus the residual 
return from the expanded market model regression: 
                                                             
where rj,t is the return on stock j in week t and rm,t is the return on the CRSP value-weighted market index in week t. 
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Using an effective tax rate measured over a five-year long horizon avoids annual 
volatility in effective tax rates, and mitigates concerns about earnings management through 
accruals because accruals are likely to reverse over the long run. On the other hand, computing 
this measure over longer horizons reduces our sample size and hence we use this measure as a 
robustness test. The second measure that we utilize is based on Desai and Dharmapala (2006) 
residual book-tax difference (DDBTD). DDBTD is measured from the sum of the firm-specific 
fixed effect (µi) and the residuals (εi,t) from the following firm fixed-effect regression: 
TBTDi,t  = β1TACCi,t + µi + εi,t 
where TBTD is total book-tax difference, TACC is total accruals measured based on the 
statement of cash flows. Both variables are scaled by lagged total assets and are winsorized at 
1% and 99% levels before the regression estimation. As highlighted by Desai and Dharmapala 
(2006), book-tax difference could be influenced by both tax planning activities and accrual-based 
earnings management. Hence, by estimating DDBTD from this firm fixed-effect regression, this 
measure attempts to isolate the component of book-tax difference and hence the tax aggressive 
activity that is unexplained by earnings management. We report the main results of H1 in Table 
9. The results indicate that both alternative measures of tax aggressiveness are positively and 
significantly associated with insider purchase profitability. These results are consistent with our 
analysis using CETR, TBTD, DTAX and SHELTER as our main measures of tax aggressiveness.  
5.4.2 Controlling for the effects of accrual management 
 Prior work suggests that insiders may manipulate their earnings prior to opportunistic 
insider trading (e.g. Beneish and Vargus 2002; Bartov and Mohanram 2004). Prior research also 
suggests that tax aggressiveness is associated with aggressive financial reporting (e.g. Frank et 
al. 2009). Hence, there may be potential concerns that the association between tax aggressiveness 
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and insider trading profitability that we are documenting is merely a result of the prior 
documented association between accrual management and insider trading. To alleviate this 
concern, we include discretionary accruals (ACCEM) based on the cross-sectional Modified 
Jones (1991) model as an additional control.
23
 The results are presented in Table 10. As observed 
from this panel, our main results are virtually unchanged after controlling for accruals 
management, indicating that the positive association between tax aggressiveness and insider 
purchase profitability is not merely driven by previously documented effects of accruals on 
insiders’ trading.24 We also find evidence that higher accruals management are associated with 
higher insider sales profitability (t-statistic = 3.41, 2.58 and 2.49 for the CETR, DTAX and 
SHELTER regressions, respectively), which is consistent with prior finding that insiders 
manipulate earnings prior to insider trading.  
5.4.3 Controlling for CSR 
 Hoi et al. (2013) recently document that firms with excessive irresponsible corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) activities
25
 are associated with higher tax avoidance, which suggests 
that corporate culture that fosters corporate “selfishness” or “irresponsibility” towards its 
stakeholders also influences firms’ inclination to avoid taxes opportunistically. Another related 
study by Gao et al. (2014) find that firms that invest in CSR activities are committed to building 
a positive image of caring for social good and are therefore less likely to engage in profitable 
                                                          
23
 In untabulated analyses, we use accrual quality (AQ) based on Dechow and Dichev (2002) as an alternative 
measure of accruals management and our inferences are the same. 
24
 We also interact accruals management with tax aggressiveness. If insiders use their discretion to manage earnings 
in the presence of tax aggressive activities and benefit from buying at deflated prices, we expect a stronger 
association between tax aggressiveness and insider purchase profitability for firms with more accrual management. 
In untabulated results, we find that the coefficient on the interaction between tax aggressiveness and accrual 
management is not significant at conventional levels for all our tax measures.   
25
 CSR activities are defined as corporate actions widely regarded as having a significant impact on all of the firm’s 
stakeholders including shareholders, employees, communities, government, customers, etc. CSR is a shared belief 
within the organization about the “right” course of action that takes into account the economic, social, 
environmental, and other external impacts of the company’s activities (Hoi et al. 2013). 
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insider trading, which is widely perceived to be self-serving. Hence, there may be a concern that 
our documented association between tax avoidance and insider trading profitability is driven by 
firms’ CSR orientation (that is, CSR orientation is the omitted correlated variable). To alleviate 
this concern, we include CSR orientation as an additional control in a much reduced sample 
where the measure for CSR orientation from MSCI (previously KLD) is available. Following 
prior studies (e.g., Gao et al. 2014), we measure CSR score as the total number of strengths 
minus the total number of concerns in all of MSCI’s rating categories excluding human rights 
and corporate governance.
26
 Then we classify a firm as CSR-conscious (CSR=1) if it’s CSR 
score is positive, and zero otherwise. The results, after controlling for CSR orientation, are 
presented in Table 11. We continue to find that CETR and DTAX are positive and significantly 
associated with higher insider purchase profitability (t-statistic = 3.55 and 1.85, respectively). 
The coefficient on SHELTER is positive and marginally significant (t-statistic = 1.52) and the 
coefficient on TBTD is positive but insignificant (t-statistic = 0.96). However, we do not find that 
CSR orientation is negatively associated with insider trading profitability in our sample. Overall, 
our main inferences are robust to including CSR orientation as an additional control. 
  
6. Conclusion 
Whether managers make use of tax aggressive activities to extract rents from 
shareholders and the mechanisms they do so remains unclear in the existing literature 
(Armstrong et al. 2015). Our study addresses this void by providing direct empirical evidence on 
managerial rent extraction derived from tax aggressive activities, and we proxy for the extent of 
                                                          
26
 Following Gao et al. (2014), we exclude the human rights dimension due to the lack of variation in the data, and 
we exclude the corporate governance dimension because it is commonly perceived as a distinct construct from CSR. 
Therefore, the included dimensions are: community affairs, diversity, employee relations, customer relations, 
gambling, firearms, tobacco, nuclear power, military and alcohol. 
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rent extraction by the amount of insider trading profitability. Using a large sample of firms from 
fiscal years 1995–2010 and controlling for factors associated with insider trading, we document 
that insider trading purchase profitability is significantly higher in more tax aggressive firms. 
This result is consistent with tax aggressiveness increasing financial opacity and insiders 
exploiting an information advantage to purchase their company shares and profit from it. In 
contrast, we do not find that insider trading sale profitability is significantly higher in more tax 
aggressive firms on average, presumably because insider sale transactions are generally less 
informative because insiders sell for other reasons such as diversification or portfolio rebalancing 
and for liquidity needs (Ofek and Yermack 2000).  
We conduct a series of additional analyses to corroborate our findings and to provide 
additional insights. First, we find that the positive association between tax aggressiveness and 
insider trading profitability is weakened for firms with more effective monitoring (proxied by 
institutional ownership) and for firms with better information environment (proxied by analyst 
following and bid-ask spread). Second, we separately examine the profitability of inside trades 
by insider types: 1) CEOs and CFOs; 2) other officers and; 3) non-officer directors, and find that 
all insiders are able to purchase profitably for firms with higher tax aggressiveness. This result 
suggests that the opacity and agency problems surrounding tax aggressiveness permeate the 
entire firm such that all insiders, including supposedly less informed non-officer directors, are 
able to profit from their purchases. Third, we document higher insider purchase profitability 
associated with tax aggressiveness during restricted trading windows but fail to document such 
association outside these restricted windows. This result suggests that insiders of tax aggressive 
firms are able to trade more profitably because they time their trades strategically during periods 
of high information asymmetry before earnings announcement. Fourth, we explore a setting 
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where insider sale transactions are more likely to be information-driven to examine whether 
insiders of tax aggressive firms are able to trade more profitably from their sale transactions. We 
document that tax aggressiveness is significantly associated with greater insider sale volume in 
the fiscal year prior to the crash, providing some evidence that insiders of tax aggressive firms 
trade opportunistically to avoid losses prior to stock price crashes. Finally, we find that our 
results are robust to using two alternative measures of tax aggressiveness: the long-run cash 
effective tax rate developed by Dyreng et al. (2008) and the residual book-tax difference based 
on Desai and Dharmapala (2006), controlling for the documented effects of accrual management 
on insiders’ trading, and controlling for firm’s CSR orientation.  
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to document direct large sample 
empirical evidence of managerial rent extraction related to tax aggressiveness. We also provide 
insights that managers extract rents from tax aggressiveness through insider purchase but not 
insider sale transactions on average. Our finding is particularly important in light of the 
substantial amount of studies that rely on this agency argument to develop their hypothesis (e.g., 
Chen et al. 2010; Kim et al. 2011; Goh et al. 2013). Because there are many ways in which 
managers can extract rent from shareholders, such as investing in pet projects, engaging in perks 
consumption, shirking and slack performance, future studies can explore how managers extract 
rent from tax aggressive activities through these channels.    
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APPENDIX 
Variables Definition 
SALE_PROFIT = Aggregate profitability of all insider trades from insider sale 
transactions during the fiscal year, computed as follows: 
∑          
 
                  
      
 
where ABRETitj is equal to the one-year ahead buy-and-hold 
abnormal return computed for the period starting one day after 
transaction date j, VALUE_SOLDitj equals the total dollar value of 
shares sold by all insiders on day j, and n is the total number of 
firm-days with insider sale activity during firm-year it, and MVit-1 
is the market value of equity at the end of fiscal year t-1. This 
measure is multiplied by -1 so that losses avoided on sales have 
the same sign as gains on purchases. 
PURCH_PROFIT = Aggregate profitability of all insider trades from insider purchase 
transactions during the fiscal year, computed as follows: 
∑          
 
                       
      
 
where ABRETitj is equal to the one-year ahead buy-and-hold 
abnormal return computed for the period starting one day after 
transaction date j, VALUE_PURCHASEDitj equals the total dollar 
value of shares purchased by all insiders on day j, and n is the total 
number of firm-days with insider purchase activity during firm-
year it, and MVit-1 is the market value of equity at the end of fiscal 
year t-1. 
SALE_FREQ = Number of insider sale transactions during the fiscal year. 
PURCH_FREQ = Number of insider purchase transactions during the fiscal year. 
SALE_VOL = Log of 1 + Dollar value of shares sold during the fiscal year. 
PURCH_VOL = Log of 1 + Dollar value of shares purchased during the fiscal year. 
CETR = Cash taxes paid (TXPD) divided by pre-tax income (PI). 
Following Chen et al. (2010), we remove observations with 
negative pre-tax income, and those observations with CETR below 
zero or above one. We then multiply CETR by minus one so that it 
is increasing in tax aggressiveness. 
TBTD = Total book-to-tax differences which is computed as TXDI + (STR 
– ETR)  PI, where TXDI refers to deferred tax expense, STR 
refers to the statutory tax rate, ETR refers to the effective tax rate 
(income tax expense divided by pretax income) and PI refers to 
pretax income. This measure is then scaled by lagged total assets. 
DTAX = Discretionary component of the permanent book-to-tax 
differences, as in Frank et al. (2009). This variable is the residuals 
from the following  regression (estimated by year and two-digit 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code): 
PERMDIFF = α0 + α1(1/ATLAG) + α2INTANG + α3UNCON + 
α4MI + α5CSTE + α6ΔNOL + α7LAGPERM + ε 
where PERMDIFF refers to total book-tax differences (TBTD) 
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less temporary book-tax-differences (defined as total deferred tax 
expense divided by statutory marginal tax rate), ATLAG refers to 
lagged total assets (AT), INTANG refers to goodwill and other 
intangibles (INTAN), UNCON refers to income/loss reported 
under the equity method (ESUB), MI refers to income/loss 
attributable to minority interest (MII), CSTE refers to current state 
tax expense (TXS), ΔNOL refers to the change in net operating 
loss carry forwards (TLCF) and LAGPERM is the lagged 
PERMDIFF. PERMDIFF, INTANG, UNCON, MI, CSTE and 
ΔNOL are all scaled by lagged total assets. 
SHELTER = The tax shelter prediction score developed by Wilson (2009), 
computed as: 
SHELTER = 4.30 + 6.63  TBTD - 1.72  LEV + 0.66  SIZE + 
2.26  ROA + 1.62  FI + 1.56  R&D,  
where TBTD refers to total book-tax difference scaled by lagged 
total assets, LEV refers to long term debt divided by total assets, 
SIZE refers to the log of total assets, ROA refers to pre-tax 
earnings divided by total assets, FI refers to an indicator variable 
set equal to 1 for firm observations reporting foreign income, and 
set to 0 otherwise, and R&D refers to the research and 
development expenditure divided by lagged total assets. 
CETR5 = Following Dyreng et al. (2008), this measure is computed as five-
year sum of cash taxes paid (TXPD)/(five-year sum of pretax 
income (PI) less special items (SPI)). We then multiply CETR5 by 
minus one so that it is increasing in tax aggressiveness. 
DDBTD = Desai and Dharmapala (2006) residual book-tax difference: µi + 
εi,t from the following firm fixed-effect regression: 
BTDi,t  = β1TACCi,t + µi + εi,t 
where BTD is total book-tax difference, TACC is total accruals 
measured based on the statement of cash flows. Both variables are 
scaled by lagged total assets and are winsorized at 1% and 99% 
levels before the regression estimation.  
lnMV = Natural log of market capitalization at fiscal year-end. 
BTM = Book-to-market ratio at fiscal year-end. 
Prior_RET = Buy-and-hold abnormal returns over the one-year period ending 
one day before the first insider trading transaction during the fiscal 
year, set to zero for firm-years without any insider trading activity. 
AGE = Firm age measured by the number of years the company has stock 
price data on CRSP. 
RND = An indicator variable equals one if the firm report non-zero 
research and development expenses (XRD), and zero otherwise. 
MAG_AR = The median of absolute market reaction to prior quarterly earnings 
announcements, where market reaction is measured as the 
cumulative abnormal return from two days before to the day of the 
earnings announcement (Huddart and Ke 2007); the median is 
measure over the five year period ending the fiscal quarter before 
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the end of the current fiscal year. 
ANALYST = Number of analysts following a firm at fiscal year-end. 
IOHOLD = Percentage of institutional ownership at fiscal year-end. 
FSINFORM = Financial statement informativeness computed as the adjusted R
2
 
from a firm-specific time-series regression of price per share 
(PRCCQ) on book value per share (CEQQ/CSHOQ) and earnings 
per share (IBQ/CSHOQ) using quarterly data from Compustat for 
the 20-quarter period ending with the fourth quarter of the current 
fiscal year. 
RET_VOL = Stock returns volatility over the current fiscal year. 
SPREAD = Bid-ask spread over the current fiscal year. 
ACCEM = Discretionary accruals based on the cross-sectional Modified 
Jones (1991) model for all firms in the Compustat universe, 
estimated by 2-digit SIC industry and fiscal year. 
AQ = Accrual quality as in Dechow and Dichev (2002), defined as the 
standard deviation of the residual over t-2 to t, where the residual 
is estimated from the following equation by industry (2-digit SIC) 
and year. 
                                    
where ΔWC is changes in working capital, where working capital 
is Δaccount receivables (RECT)+ Δinventory (INVT)- Δaccount 
payable (AP) - Δtax payable (TXP)+ Δother current asset (ACO) - 
Δother current liabilities. CFO is cash flows from operation 
(OANCF). All variables are scaled by the average total assets. 
CSR = An indicator equals one if the firm-year’s CSR score is positive, 
and zero otherwise. The CSR score is computed as the total 
number of strengths minus the total number of concerns in all of 
MSCI’s rating categories excluding human rights and corporate 
governance. 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Q1 Q3 
SALE_PROFIT      45,502  0.015 0.000 1.724 0.000 0.010 
SALE_PROFIT (unscaled)      45,502  -33,558 0.000 11,535,692 0.000 61,142 
SALE_FREQ      45,502  19.909 2.000 131.326 0.000 12.000 
PURCH_PROFIT      45,502  0.006 0.000 0.272 0.000 0.000 
PURCH_PROFIT (unscaled)      45,502  9,714 0.000 1,031,504 0.000 0.000 
PURCH_FREQ      45,502  2.009 0.000 8.952 0.000 1.000 
CETR      30,197  -0.256 -0.256 0.180 -0.358 -0.115 
TBTD      40,015  -0.031 0.001 0.146 -0.039 0.029 
DTAX      45,502  0.005 0.004 0.100 -0.016 0.036 
SHELTER      39,899  -0.119 -0.029 2.362 -1.306 1.417 
lnMV      45,502  6.060 5.977 1.918 4.666 7.299 
BTM      45,502  0.564 0.488 4.287 0.286 0.758 
Prior_RET      45,502  0.096 0.000 0.804 -0.150 0.160 
AGE      45,502  17.551 13.000 15.731 6.000 25.000 
RND      45,502  0.408 0.000 0.491 0.000 1.000 
MAG_AR      45,502  0.034 0.030 0.019 0.020 0.044 
ANALYST      45,502  5.914 4.000 6.619 1.000 9.000 
IOHOLD      45,502  0.511 0.523 0.300 0.254 0.754 
FSINFORM      45,502  0.381 0.376 0.295 0.133 0.625 
RET_VOL      45,502  0.033 0.029 0.019 0.020 0.042 
The sample period used for the study spans from 1995-2010. The descriptive statistics for all variables are based on 
the largest sample when tax avoidance is measured by DTAX. The detailed definitions of the variables are provided 
in the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentiles.  
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TABLE 2 
Pearson and Spearman Correlation Table 
 
This table reports the Pearson (Spearman) correlation between the variables used in the regression analysis in the upper (lower) diagonal, based on the largest 
possible sample. The detailed definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. All correlations (with the exception of those shaded) are statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level or better (two-tailed). 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1 SALE_PROFIT -0.05 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.04
2 PURCH_PROFIT -0.20 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.02
3 CETR -0.04 0.04 0.49 0.13 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.08 -0.07 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.01
4 TBTD -0.05 0.04 0.61 0.47 0.73 0.15 0.10 0.06 0.17 -0.21 -0.19 0.10 0.16 0.07 -0.37
5 DTAX 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.25 0.30 0.00 -0.02 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.04
6 SHELTER -0.05 0.06 0.08 0.50 0.12 0.67 -0.06 0.08 0.35 -0.07 -0.31 0.50 0.48 0.10 -0.49
7 lnMV 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.16 -0.04 0.75 -0.37 0.07 0.34 0.00 -0.29 0.75 0.59 0.06 -0.38
8 BTM -0.08 0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.03 -0.09 -0.35 -0.17 0.01 -0.23 -0.03 -0.28 -0.16 -0.02 0.09
9 Prior_RET 0.06 -0.01 0.06 0.13 0.03 0.15 0.13 -0.18 -0.03 0.05 0.10 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.03
10 AGE -0.05 0.03 -0.09 0.16 0.01 0.32 0.25 0.08 0.03 0.02 -0.24 0.20 0.13 0.04 -0.28
11 RND 0.06 0.02 0.03 -0.14 0.08 -0.01 -0.01 -0.27 0.01 -0.02 0.25 0.04 0.05 -0.05 0.20
12 MAG_AR 0.07 0.01 0.02 -0.19 0.07 -0.32 -0.29 -0.09 0.01 -0.25 0.27 -0.12 -0.13 -0.07 0.51
13 ANALYST 0.03 0.04 -0.04 0.08 0.00 0.57 0.77 -0.32 0.10 0.09 0.05 -0.08 0.46 0.04 -0.21
14 IOHOLD 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.13 -0.02 0.53 0.62 -0.14 0.13 0.13 0.05 -0.10 0.57 0.04 -0.25
15 FSINFORM -0.03 0.01 -0.04 0.05 -0.02 0.09 0.06 -0.02 0.06 0.05 -0.04 -0.08 0.04 0.04 -0.07
16 RET_VOL 0.10 -0.03 0.01 -0.32 0.07 -0.47 -0.41 -0.01 -0.07 -0.30 0.22 0.57 -0.21 -0.22 -0.08
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TABLE 3 
Tax Aggressiveness and Profitability of Insider Trades 
  TAX = CETR TAX = TBTD TAX = DTAX TAX = SHELTER 
 
SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ 
 
PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT 
                  
TAX -0.108 0.030*** 0.193** 0.040*** -0.053 0.037*** 0.009 0.004*** 
 
(-1.18) (4.52) (1.97) (3.57) (-0.58) (3.18) (1.07) (3.83) 
lnMV 0.023 -0.001 0.019 -0.002 0.017 -0.002 0.012 -0.005** 
 
(1.16) (-0.87) (1.10) (-1.43) (1.10) (-1.43) (0.59) (-2.28) 
BTM -0.011 0.026 -0.017 0.016* -0.015 0.013 -0.020 0.014 
 
(-0.30) (1.63) (-0.81) (1.75) (-0.82) (1.58) (-0.80) (1.50) 
Prior_RET 0.164** -0.010** 0.156*** -0.011*** 0.149*** -0.010*** 0.158*** -0.011*** 
 
(2.05) (-2.58) (2.77) (-3.42) (2.84) (-3.60) (2.77) (-3.50) 
AGE 0.002** -0.000 0.002** -0.000 0.002** -0.000 0.002** -0.000 
 
(2.30) (-0.08) (2.37) (-0.76) (2.41) (-0.62) (2.34) (-1.13) 
RND -0.062* 0.009 -0.044 0.011* -0.044 0.009 -0.050* 0.010* 
 
(-1.80) (1.19) (-1.52) (1.86) (-1.52) (1.52) (-1.67) (1.73) 
MAG_AR 0.683 0.272* 0.545 0.174 0.587 0.188 0.580 0.174 
 
(1.09) (1.85) (0.93) (1.20) (1.13) (1.32) (1.02) (1.20) 
ANALYST -0.005 0.000* -0.005 0.000 -0.004 0.000 -0.005 0.000 
 
(-1.34) (1.92) (-1.51) (1.53) (-1.57) (1.53) (-1.56) (1.48) 
IOHOLD -0.057 -0.006 -0.056* 0.001 -0.047* 0.001 -0.053* -0.000 
 
(-1.55) (-1.42) (-1.77) (0.12) (-1.67) (0.30) (-1.71) (-0.00) 
FSINFORM -0.099 0.009*** -0.093 0.002 -0.083 0.002 -0.090 0.002 
 
(-1.14) (2.66) (-1.38) (0.49) (-1.41) (0.61) (-1.38) (0.46) 
RET_VOL 4.151** 0.390** 4.873*** 0.227** 3.934*** 0.100 4.561*** 0.234** 
 
(2.46) (2.15) (3.54) (2.13) (3.21) (1.07) (3.32) (2.14) 
Constant -0.366*** -0.019 -0.179 0.011 -0.158 0.011 -0.134* 0.029*** 
 
(-3.10) (-0.87) (-1.50) (0.68) (-1.52) (0.74) (-1.69) (2.94) 
         Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 30,197 30,197 40,015 40,015 45,502 45,502 39,899 39,899 
Adjusted R2 0.009 0.004 0.009 0.002 0.008 0.002 0.009 0.002 
                  
This table reports the regression results of the relation between tax avoidance and the profitability of insider trades. 
The detailed definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. T-statistics are reported in parentheses below 
the coefficient estimates. Standard errors are corrected for cross-sectional and time-series dependence (Petersen 
2009; Gow et al. 2010). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, 
respectively (two-tailed test).  
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TABLE 4 
Tax Aggressiveness and Profitability of Insider Trades - The Role of Monitoring 
  TAX = CETR TAX = TBTD TAX = DTAX TAX = SHELTER 
 
SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ 
 
PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT 
                  
TAX -0.086 0.072*** 0.195 0.056*** -0.182 0.068*** 0.007 0.006*** 
 
(-0.42) (5.00) (1.48) (4.84) (-1.13) (3.77) (0.70) (4.62) 
TAX×IOHOLD -0.042 -0.083*** -0.008 -0.044** 0.311 -0.076*** 0.005 -0.005*** 
 
(-0.16) (-4.12) (-0.04) (-2.41) (1.51) (-3.33) (0.32) (-4.02) 
lnMV 0.023 -0.001 0.019 -0.002 0.016 -0.002 0.012 -0.005** 
 
(1.16) (-0.88) (1.09) (-1.38) (1.08) (-1.39) (0.58) (-2.24) 
BTM -0.011 0.026 -0.017 0.016* -0.015 0.013 -0.020 0.014 
 
(-0.30) (1.64) (-0.81) (1.71) (-0.80) (1.57) (-0.78) (1.46) 
Prior_RET 0.164** -0.009** 0.156*** -0.011*** 0.148*** -0.010*** 0.158*** -0.011*** 
 
(2.05) (-2.51) (2.77) (-3.43) (2.84) (-3.58) (2.76) (-3.53) 
AGE 0.002** -0.000 0.002** -0.000 0.002** -0.000 0.002** -0.000 
 
(2.27) (-0.22) (2.37) (-0.76) (2.42) (-0.68) (2.30) (-0.71) 
RND -0.062* 0.009 -0.044 0.011* -0.044 0.009 -0.050* 0.010* 
 
(-1.81) (1.18) (-1.52) (1.86) (-1.53) (1.54) (-1.66) (1.76) 
MAG_AR 0.681 0.268* 0.545 0.174 0.585 0.189 0.577 0.178 
 
(1.08) (1.82) (0.93) (1.21) (1.13) (1.32) (1.00) (1.22) 
ANALYST -0.005 0.000* -0.005 0.000 -0.004 0.000 -0.005 0.000* 
 
(-1.34) (1.95) (-1.51) (1.48) (-1.57) (1.52) (-1.57) (1.79) 
IOHOLD -0.068 -0.027*** -0.057* -0.001 -0.049* 0.002 -0.051* -0.002 
 
(-0.78) (-4.82) (-1.88) (-0.15) (-1.69) (0.36) (-1.87) (-0.39) 
FSINFORM -0.099 0.010*** -0.093 0.002 -0.083 0.002 -0.090 0.002 
 
(-1.14) (2.66) (-1.38) (0.49) (-1.41) (0.61) (-1.38) (0.47) 
RET_VOL 4.150** 0.389** 4.873*** 0.229** 3.924*** 0.102 4.544*** 0.252** 
 
(2.46) (2.16) (3.55) (2.14) (3.23) (1.09) (3.39) (2.24) 
Constant -0.361*** -0.009 -0.179 0.012 -0.156 0.011 -0.134* 0.029*** 
 
(-2.75) (-0.43) (-1.50) (0.70) (-1.51) (0.71) (-1.66) (3.11) 
         Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 30,197 30,197 40,015 40,015 45,502 45,502 39,899 39,899 
Adjusted R2 0.009 0.004 0.009 0.002 0.008 0.002 0.009 0.002 
                  
This table reports the regression results of the role of monitoring on the relation between tax avoidance and the 
profitability of insider trades, where monitoring is proxied by institutional ownership. The detailed definitions of the 
variables are provided in the Appendix. T-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
Standard errors are corrected for cross-sectional and time-series dependence (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010). ***, 
**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively (two-tailed test).  
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TABLE 5 
Tax Aggressiveness and Profitability of Insider Trades - The Role of Information 
Environment 
Panel A: Analyst Following 
  TAX = CETR TAX = TBTD TAX = DTAX TAX = SHELTER 
 
SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ 
 
PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT 
                  
TAX -0.053 0.045*** 0.137 0.045*** -0.184 0.046*** 0.004 0.004*** 
 
(-0.38) (4.48) (1.10) (4.43) (-1.03) (3.49) (0.46) (4.34) 
TAX×ANALYST -0.010 -0.003*** 0.013 -0.001 0.030 -0.002*** 0.001 -0.000** 
 
(-0.88) (-3.92) (0.88) (-1.53) (1.45) (-2.59) (1.09) (-2.38) 
lnMV 0.023 -0.001 0.019 -0.002 0.016 -0.002 0.012 -0.005** 
 
(1.15) (-0.92) (1.09) (-1.43) (1.06) (-1.41) (0.59) (-2.28) 
BTM -0.011 0.027 -0.016 0.016* -0.016 0.013 -0.021 0.014 
 
(-0.28) (1.64) (-0.74) (1.74) (-0.83) (1.59) (-0.83) (1.51) 
Prior_RET 0.165** -0.009** 0.157*** -0.011*** 0.148*** -0.010*** 0.158*** -0.011*** 
 
(2.06) (-2.53) (2.77) (-3.42) (2.84) (-3.60) (2.77) (-3.51) 
AGE 0.002** -0.000 0.002** -0.000 0.002** -0.000 0.002** -0.000 
 
(2.25) (-0.20) (2.34) (-0.73) (2.42) (-0.63) (2.16) (-0.79) 
RND -0.062* 0.009 -0.044 0.011* -0.044 0.009 -0.051* 0.010* 
 
(-1.78) (1.20) (-1.52) (1.86) (-1.53) (1.52) (-1.66) (1.76) 
MAG_AR 0.679 0.270* 0.556 0.173 0.593 0.188 0.604 0.171 
 
(1.08) (1.84) (0.97) (1.19) (1.15) (1.31) (1.09) (1.17) 
ANALYST -0.007** -0.000 -0.005 0.000 -0.005 0.000 -0.006* 0.001** 
 
(-2.57) (-1.42) (-1.46) (1.46) (-1.62) (1.57) (-1.72) (2.17) 
IOHOLD -0.056 -0.006 -0.055* 0.000 -0.047* 0.001 -0.037 -0.002 
 
(-1.54) (-1.34) (-1.75) (0.09) (-1.67) (0.30) (-1.38) (-0.44) 
FSINFORM -0.099 0.009*** -0.094 0.002 -0.083 0.002 -0.091 0.002 
 
(-1.14) (2.64) (-1.39) (0.50) (-1.41) (0.61) (-1.39) (0.48) 
RET_VOL 4.151** 0.390** 4.864*** 0.227** 3.917*** 0.101 4.524*** 0.239** 
 
(2.46) (2.16) (3.55) (2.13) (3.23) (1.08) (3.36) (2.18) 
Constant -0.356*** -0.016 -0.182 0.012 -0.154 0.011 -0.137* 0.029*** 
 
(-2.92) (-0.75) (-1.53) (0.69) (-1.49) (0.72) (-1.71) (2.98) 
         Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 30,197 30,197 40,015 40,015 45,502 45,502 39,899 39,899 
Adjusted R2 0.009 0.004 0.009 0.002 0.008 0.002 0.009 0.002 
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TABLE 5 (Con’t) 
Panel B: Bid-Ask Spread 
  TAX = CETR TAX = TBTD TAX = DTAX TAX = SHELTER 
 
SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ 
 
PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT 
                  
TAX -0.138 0.004 0.297** 0.031** 0.013 0.016 0.012 0.002** 
 
(-1.16) (0.73) (2.26) (1.99) (0.12) (1.42) (1.13) (2.38) 
TAX×SPREAD 1.708 1.511*** -4.863** 0.606** -3.197* 1.195*** -0.150 0.083*** 
 
(0.78) (4.77) (-2.07) (2.03) (-1.93) (3.62) (-1.18) (4.69) 
SPREAD 0.030 0.257 -1.242 -0.335* -0.846 -0.367** -1.157 -0.196 
 
(0.01) (0.95) (-1.02) (-1.73) (-0.73) (-2.16) (-0.81) (-1.02) 
lnMV 0.023 -0.002 0.015 -0.004** 0.013 -0.004** 0.008 -0.007** 
 
(0.74) (-1.43) (0.61) (-1.99) (0.61) (-2.15) (0.28) (-2.42) 
BTM -0.009 0.027 -0.013 0.017* -0.013 0.014 -0.017 0.014 
 
(-0.24) (1.62) (-0.62) (1.71) (-0.73) (1.61) (-0.74) (1.46) 
Prior_RET 0.163* -0.010** 0.152*** -0.012*** 0.145*** -0.012*** 0.154*** -0.012*** 
 
(1.91) (-2.31) (2.68) (-3.35) (2.74) (-3.45) (2.66) (-3.43) 
AGE 0.002** -0.000 0.002** -0.000 0.002** -0.000 0.002** -0.000 
 
(2.41) (-0.15) (2.43) (-0.27) (2.52) (-0.10) (2.41) (-0.33) 
RND -0.063* 0.009 -0.047 0.010* -0.047* 0.008 -0.053* 0.009* 
 
(-1.95) (1.20) (-1.63) (1.83) (-1.65) (1.45) (-1.80) (1.72) 
MAG_AR 0.667 0.258* 0.491 0.150 0.538 0.162 0.529 0.156 
 
(1.20) (1.86) (0.86) (1.08) (1.08) (1.18) (0.95) (1.12) 
ANALYST -0.005 0.000** -0.004 0.001** -0.004 0.001** -0.005 0.001** 
 
(-1.01) (2.02) (-1.16) (2.03) (-1.18) (2.17) (-1.24) (2.16) 
IOHOLD -0.067 -0.009 -0.082** -0.007 -0.068* -0.006 -0.077* -0.007 
 
(-1.23) (-1.15) (-2.01) (-1.26) (-1.81) (-1.15) (-1.73) (-1.22) 
FSINFORM -0.100 0.010*** -0.094 0.003 -0.083 0.003 -0.091 0.003 
 
(-1.12) (2.70) (-1.37) (0.62) (-1.37) (0.77) (-1.36) (0.60) 
RET_VOL 4.309* 0.429* 5.186*** 0.341** 4.251*** 0.215 4.838*** 0.361** 
 
(1.91) (1.73) (3.26) (2.33) (2.97) (1.63) (2.97) (2.46) 
Constant -0.254 -0.004 -0.169 0.015 -0.122 0.029** -0.126 0.028* 
 
(-0.97) (-0.33) (-1.19) (1.06) (-0.79) (2.02) (-0.72) (1.69) 
         Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 30,058 30,058 39,748 39,748 45,179 45,179 39,632 39,632 
Adjusted R2 0.009 0.004 0.009 0.002 0.008 0.002 0.009 0.002 
                  
This table reports the regression results of the role of information environment on the relation between tax avoidance 
and the profitability of insider trades. In Panel A, we report the results when information environment is proxied by 
analyst following. In Panel B, we report the results when information environment is proxied by bid-ask spread. The 
detailed definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. T-statistics are reported in parentheses below the 
coefficient estimates. Standard errors are corrected for cross-sectional and time-series dependence (Petersen 2009; 
Gow et al. 2010). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, 
respectively (two-tailed test).  
 
52 
 
TABLE 6 
Tax Aggressiveness and Profitability of Insider Trades by Insider Type 
Panel A: CEOs/CFOs 
  TAX = CETR TAX = TBTD TAX = DTAX TAX = SHELTER 
 
SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ 
 
PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT 
                  
TAX -0.046 0.022*** 0.168*** 0.031*** 0.005 0.019** 0.008 0.002*** 
 
(-0.79) (3.42) (2.67) (3.81) (0.10) (2.55) (1.37) (4.24) 
         Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 28,007 28,007 36,912 36,912 41,987 41,987 36,796 36,796 
Adjusted R
2
 0.009 0.003 0.009 0.001 0.008 0.001 0.009 0.001 
                  
Panel B: Other Officers 
  TAX = CETR TAX = TBTD TAX = DTAX TAX = SHELTER 
 
SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ 
 
PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT 
                  
TAX -0.054 0.009*** 0.058 0.011** -0.044 0.021** 0.003 0.001** 
 
(-1.33) (3.38) (1.12) (2.33) (-0.76) (2.55) (0.76) (2.25) 
         Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 29,373 29,373 38,619 38,619 43,915 43,915 38,509 38,509 
Adjusted R
2
 0.009 0.002 0.008 0.001 0.008 0.001 0.008 0.001 
                  
Panel C: Non-officer Directors 
  TAX = CETR TAX = TBTD TAX = DTAX TAX = SHELTER 
 
SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ 
 
PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT 
                  
TAX -0.168 0.043** 0.172 0.096*** -0.001 0.146*** 0.000 0.009*** 
 
(-1.33) (2.48) (0.82) (4.67) (-0.00) (3.26) (0.04) (6.66) 
         Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 30,106 30,106 39,740 39,740 45,187 45,187 39,627 39,627 
Adjusted R
2
 0.010 0.003 0.007 0.002 0.007 0.002 0.007 0.002 
                  
This table reports the regression results of the relation between tax avoidance and the profitability of insider trades 
by insider type. The detailed definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Standard errors are corrected for cross-sectional and time-series 
dependence (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 
0.10 level or better, respectively (two-tailed test).  
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TABLE 7 
Tax Aggressiveness and Timing of Insider Trades 
Panel A: Restricted trade window 
  TAX = CETR TAX = TBTD TAX = DTAX TAX = SHELTER 
 
SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ 
 
PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT 
                  
TAX -0.022 0.007*** 0.044 0.016** 0.054* 0.015 0.003 0.001* 
 
(-1.39) (3.20) (1.46) (1.98) (1.76) (1.54) (1.32) (1.76) 
lnMV 0.005 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
 
(1.35) (0.13) (0.34) (0.89) (0.50) (1.20) (-0.19) (-0.44) 
BTM -0.006 0.009** -0.006 0.005*** -0.005 0.005** -0.007 0.005** 
 
(-0.58) (2.36) (-0.88) (2.59) (-0.83) (2.48) (-1.16) (2.49) 
Prior_RET 0.024** -0.002 0.019** -0.003** 0.018** -0.002** 0.019** -0.003** 
 
(2.21) (-1.19) (2.14) (-2.05) (2.15) (-2.07) (2.12) (-1.98) 
AGE 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 
(1.56) (-1.59) (1.26) (-1.48) (1.35) (-1.28) (1.12) (-1.64) 
RND -0.011 0.004 -0.006 0.003 -0.006 0.002 -0.007 0.003 
 
(-1.16) (1.32) (-0.78) (1.46) (-1.00) (1.21) (-1.04) (1.35) 
MAG_AR -0.103 0.025 -0.095 -0.002 -0.112 0.012 -0.093 -0.002 
 
(-0.50) (0.57) (-0.72) (-0.06) (-0.78) (0.33) (-0.70) (-0.05) 
ANALYST -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 
(-1.37) (0.68) (-0.93) (-1.09) (-1.00) (-1.16) (-0.95) (-1.17) 
IOHOLD -0.005 -0.003* 0.000 -0.003* 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.003* 
 
(-0.57) (-1.96) (0.07) (-1.79) (0.04) (-1.33) (0.03) (-1.88) 
FSINFORM -0.015 0.002 -0.010 0.001 -0.009 0.001 -0.010 0.001 
 
(-1.49) (1.28) (-1.43) (0.89) (-1.55) (0.97) (-1.43) (0.90) 
RET_VOL 0.658*** -0.004 0.581*** 0.035 0.468*** -0.016 0.566*** 0.029 
 
(2.71) (-0.05) (3.21) (0.80) (2.98) (-0.52) (3.12) (0.62) 
Constant -0.075** -0.000 -0.011 -0.004 -0.011 -0.004 0.008 0.013 
 
(-2.05) (-0.01) (-0.54) (-1.03) (-0.62) (-1.23) (0.26) (1.25) 
         Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 29,887 29,887 39,434 39,434 44,828 44,828 39,319 39,319 
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 
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TABLE 7 (Con’t) 
Panel B: Outside restricted trade window 
  TAX = CETR TAX = TBTD TAX = DTAX TAX = SHELTER 
 
SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ 
 
PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT 
                  
TAX -0.089 -0.118 0.156 0.184* -0.106 -0.067 0.006 0.008 
 
(-1.06) (-1.26) (1.64) (1.86) (-1.58) (-0.81) (0.76) (1.03) 
lnMV 0.019 0.024 0.019 0.020 0.016 0.017 0.014 0.014 
 
(0.89) (1.11) (1.08) (1.10) (1.04) (1.09) (0.67) (0.65) 
BTM -0.005 -0.020 -0.012 -0.023 -0.011 -0.021 -0.013 -0.025 
 
(-0.13) (-0.67) (-0.46) (-1.03) (-0.48) (-1.05) (-0.43) (-0.95) 
Prior_RET 0.140 0.165* 0.136** 0.158** 0.130** 0.150** 0.138** 0.159** 
 
(1.58) (1.73) (2.29) (2.47) (2.32) (2.52) (2.26) (2.44) 
AGE 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 
 
(2.16) (2.28) (2.36) (2.51) (2.38) (2.52) (2.31) (2.42) 
RND -0.056 -0.071 -0.043 -0.052 -0.041 -0.050 -0.047 -0.057 
 
(-1.37) (-1.40) (-1.39) (-1.39) (-1.37) (-1.40) (-1.46) (-1.49) 
MAG_AR 0.821 0.693 0.660 0.567 0.729 0.605 0.694 0.603 
 
(1.57) (1.29) (1.24) (0.95) (1.53) (1.12) (1.30) (1.00) 
ANALYST -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 
 
(-0.98) (-1.29) (-1.28) (-1.42) (-1.29) (-1.47) (-1.34) (-1.48) 
IOHOLD -0.057* -0.058 -0.063** -0.060** -0.052** -0.050* -0.060** -0.057* 
 
(-1.72) (-1.58) (-2.27) (-1.98) (-2.07) (-1.82) (-2.22) (-1.88) 
FSINFORM -0.084 -0.102 -0.084 -0.095 -0.074 -0.084 -0.081 -0.092 
 
(-1.16) (-1.24) (-1.50) (-1.53) (-1.53) (-1.58) (-1.51) (-1.54) 
RET_VOL 3.548*** 4.210*** 4.413*** 4.959*** 3.561*** 4.046*** 4.116*** 4.654*** 
 
(2.81) (3.02) (3.78) (3.88) (3.51) (3.64) (3.66) (3.75) 
Constant -0.303** -0.377*** -0.212* -0.219** -0.182* -0.189** -0.149 -0.154 
 
(-2.02) (-2.60) (-1.91) (-1.96) (-1.92) (-1.98) (-0.97) (-1.07) 
         Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 29,887 29,887 39,434 39,434 44,828 44,828 39,319 39,319 
Adjusted R2 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009 
                  
This table panel A (Panel B) reports the regression results of the relation between tax avoidance and the profitability 
of insider trades within (outside) the restricted trading window, where the restricted trading window is defined as the 
window starting 46 days prior to the earnings announcement to one day after the earnings announcement. The 
detailed definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. T-statistics are reported in parentheses below the 
coefficient estimates. Standard errors are corrected for cross-sectional and time-series dependence (Petersen 2009; 
Gow et al. 2010). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, 
respectively (two-tailed test).  
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TABLE 8 
Tax Aggressiveness and Timing of Insider Trades – Prior to Stock Price Crashes 
  TAX = CETR TAX = TBTD TAX = DTAX TAX = SHELTER 
 
SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ 
 
VOL VOL VOL VOL VOL VOL VOL VOL 
                  
TAX 0.761*** -0.174* 1.246*** -0.050 0.137 -0.087 0.136*** -0.008 
 
(3.90) (-1.85) (6.41) (-0.42) (0.56) (-0.66) (6.97) (-0.81) 
lnMV 0.345*** 0.057** 0.304*** 0.076*** 0.311*** 0.079*** 0.212*** 0.083*** 
 
(7.70) (2.48) (8.52) (3.82) (8.83) (4.16) (6.48) (4.41) 
BTM -1.018*** -0.077 -0.869*** 0.027 -0.787*** -0.009 -0.965*** 0.034 
 
(-10.00) (-1.52) (-9.96) (0.63) (-11.46) (-0.19) (-10.46) (0.76) 
Prior_RET 1.291*** -0.120*** 1.169*** -0.179*** 1.223*** -0.190*** 1.172*** -0.181*** 
 
(12.49) (-2.59) (14.04) (-4.91) (14.26) (-4.91) (13.96) (-4.79) 
AGE -0.006* -0.001 -0.010*** -0.002* -0.008*** -0.002* -0.010*** -0.002* 
 
(-1.89) (-0.97) (-3.69) (-1.73) (-3.18) (-1.65) (-4.06) (-1.67) 
RND 0.321*** 0.048 0.313*** 0.024 0.286*** 0.008 0.261*** 0.025 
 
(2.63) (0.74) (3.06) (0.43) (2.81) (0.14) (2.61) (0.45) 
MAG_AR 6.102* -1.408* 6.995*** -0.575 7.707*** -0.280 6.924*** -0.404 
 
(1.92) (-1.90) (3.18) (-0.67) (3.69) (-0.34) (3.15) (-0.45) 
ANALYST 0.058*** -0.008* 0.076*** -0.009** 0.072*** -0.009*** 0.074*** -0.009** 
 
(6.37) (-1.68) (8.26) (-2.46) (8.59) (-2.80) (8.15) (-2.48) 
IOHOLD 1.850*** -0.124 1.615*** -0.111 1.696*** -0.091 1.577*** -0.103 
 
(9.85) (-1.36) (8.47) (-1.62) (8.70) (-1.19) (8.19) (-1.51) 
FSINFORM 0.594*** -0.128*** 0.511*** -0.069* 0.541*** -0.072* 0.515*** -0.072* 
 
(3.91) (-2.63) (3.13) (-1.67) (3.63) (-1.79) (3.22) (-1.71) 
RET_VOL -9.488*** 10.414*** -14.761*** 10.570*** -17.484*** 10.255*** -13.653*** 10.516*** 
 
(-2.86) (5.37) (-4.86) (5.09) (-6.34) (5.60) (-4.44) (5.08) 
Constant -2.998*** -0.509*** 0.425 -0.099 0.333 -0.096 1.107 -0.154 
 
(-7.90) (-3.37) (0.36) (-0.33) (0.64) (-0.13) (0.91) (-0.48) 
         Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 6,725 6,725 8,664 8,664 9,704 9,704 8,624 8,624 
Adjusted R2 0.366 0.026 0.360 0.032 0.363 0.034 0.363 0.032 
                  
This table reports the regression results of the relation between tax avoidance and the intensity of insider trading 
during the fiscal year before stock price crashes. The detailed definitions of the variables are provided in the 
Appendix. T-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Standard errors are corrected for 
cross-sectional and time-series dependence (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010). ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively (two-tailed test).  
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TABLE 9 
Tax Aggressiveness and Profitability of Insider Trades – Alternative Tax Measures 
    TAX = CETR5 TAX = DDBTD 
  
SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ 
  
PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT 
            
TAX 
 
-0.112 0.018* 0.055 0.038* 
  
(-0.56) (1.74) (0.41) (1.95) 
lnMV 
 
0.030 0.001 0.018 -0.003 
  
(1.18) (0.40) (1.08) (-1.48) 
BTM 
 
0.008 0.031 -0.014 0.016* 
  
(0.21) (1.62) (-0.71) (1.69) 
Prior_RET 
 
0.187** -0.005 0.160*** -0.010*** 
  
(2.17) (-1.56) (2.84) (-3.27) 
AGE 
 
0.002** -0.000** 0.002** -0.000 
  
(2.06) (-2.35) (2.43) (-0.56) 
RND 
 
-0.070* 0.010 -0.049* 0.011* 
  
(-1.83) (1.21) (-1.70) (1.78) 
MAG_AR 
 
0.947 0.213 0.580 0.179 
  
(1.20) (1.02) (0.98) (1.23) 
ANALYST 
 
-0.005 0.000 -0.005 0.000 
  
(-1.34) (1.20) (-1.44) (1.50) 
IOHOLD 
 
-0.067 -0.007 -0.053 0.000 
  
(-1.55) (-1.19) (-1.63) (0.02) 
FSINFORM 
 
-0.104 0.010* -0.091 0.003 
  
(-1.02) (1.78) (-1.35) (0.54) 
RET_VOL 
 
3.682* 0.387* 4.436*** 0.179 
  
(1.72) (1.80) (3.36) (1.56) 
Constant 
 
-0.307 -0.020 -0.180 0.011 
  
(-1.35) (-0.91) (-1.50) (0.65) 
      Industry FE 
 
YES YES YES YES 
Observations 
 
24,811 24,811 39,983 39,983 
Adjusted R
2
 
 
0.011 0.003 0.009 0.002 
           
This table reports the regression results of the relation between tax avoidance and the profitability of insider trades, 
using two alternative tax avoidance measures. The detailed definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Standard errors are corrected for cross-
sectional and time-series dependence (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010). ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively (two-tailed test).  
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TABLE 10 
Tax Aggressiveness and Profitability of Insider Trades, Controlling for the Effects of 
Accrual Management 
  TAX = CETR TAX = TBTD TAX = DTAX TAX = SHELTER 
 
SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ 
 
PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT 
                  
TAX -0.173* 0.033*** 0.106 0.043*** -0.111 0.043*** -0.003 0.004*** 
 
(-1.90) (4.29) (1.13) (3.20) (-1.23) (3.01) (-0.53) (3.15) 
ACCEM 0.296*** -0.011 0.123 -0.012 0.166** -0.011 0.180** -0.012 
 
(3.41) (-1.04) (1.55) (-0.84) (2.58) (-0.80) (2.49) (-0.80) 
lnMV 0.034 -0.001 0.025 -0.003 0.025 -0.003 0.028 -0.005** 
 
(1.55) (-0.57) (1.42) (-1.39) (1.49) (-1.54) (1.33) (-2.16) 
BTM 0.009 0.031 -0.005 0.016 -0.001 0.015 0.003 0.013 
 
(0.21) (1.59) (-0.25) (1.55) (-0.07) (1.58) (0.12) (1.27) 
Prior_RET 0.168** -0.011** 0.155*** -0.011*** 0.151*** -0.011*** 0.158*** -0.012*** 
 
(1.99) (-2.51) (2.75) (-3.43) (2.82) (-3.79) (2.77) (-3.47) 
AGE 0.002** 0.000 0.001** -0.000 0.001** -0.000 0.001** -0.000 
 
(2.10) (0.11) (2.15) (-0.64) (2.26) (-0.41) (2.15) (-1.02) 
RND -0.057 0.009 -0.042 0.011* -0.041 0.009 -0.044 0.010* 
 
(-1.53) (1.14) (-1.36) (1.82) (-1.30) (1.53) (-1.38) (1.67) 
MAG_AR 0.027 0.255* 0.172 0.173 0.112 0.161 0.218 0.175 
 
(0.05) (1.69) (0.36) (1.13) (0.23) (1.05) (0.47) (1.14) 
ANALYST -0.006 0.000 -0.005 0.000 -0.005 0.000* -0.005 0.000 
 
(-1.41) (1.56) (-1.52) (1.52) (-1.57) (1.65) (-1.53) (1.51) 
IOHOLD -0.071* -0.006 -0.065** -0.001 -0.059* 0.001 -0.056* -0.002 
 
(-1.68) (-1.48) (-2.04) (-0.19) (-1.89) (0.26) (-1.75) (-0.42) 
FSINFORM -0.141 0.012*** -0.116* 0.003 -0.114* 0.004 -0.111* 0.003 
 
(-1.44) (2.61) (-1.69) (0.56) (-1.74) (0.82) (-1.68) (0.53) 
RET_VOL 3.729** 0.509** 4.653*** 0.243** 4.289*** 0.172* 4.170*** 0.258** 
 
(2.23) (2.15) (3.38) (2.25) (3.35) (1.67) (3.09) (2.31) 
Constant -0.260** -0.004 -0.224** -0.002 -0.228*** -0.002 -0.242** 0.018 
 
(-2.31) (-0.14) (-2.42) (-0.10) (-2.60) (-0.10) (-2.30) (0.70) 
         Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 25,258 25,258 36,518 36,518 38,032 38,032 36,403 36,403 
Adjusted R2 0.010 0.004 0.009 0.002 0.009 0.001 0.009 0.002 
                  
This table reports the regression results of the relation between tax avoidance and the profitability of insider trades, 
after controlling for the effects of accrual management. The detailed definitions of the variables are provided in the 
Appendix. T-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Standard errors are corrected for 
cross-sectional and time-series dependence (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010). ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively (two-tailed test). 
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TABLE 11 
Tax Aggressiveness and Profitability of Insider Trades, Controlling for Corporate Social 
Responsibility Orientation 
  TAX = CETR TAX = TBTD TAX = DTAX TAX = SHELTER 
 
SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ 
 
PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT 
                  
TAX -0.081*** 0.006*** 0.031 0.011 0.098* 0.020* -0.006 0.001 
 
(-2.73) (3.55) (0.63) (0.96) (1.70) (1.85) (-1.06) (1.52) 
CSR 0.011 0.000 0.012 0.002 0.010 0.002 0.014 0.002 
 
(1.17) (0.29) (1.32) (0.76) (1.23) (0.78) (1.53) (0.72) 
lnMV -0.003 -0.000 0.002 -0.002* 0.001 -0.001* 0.006 -0.003*** 
 
(-0.44) (-0.73) (0.23) (-1.96) (0.10) (-1.83) (0.62) (-2.64) 
BTM -0.028 0.006*** -0.009 -0.001 -0.011 -0.000 -0.004 -0.002 
 
(-1.31) (2.78) (-0.54) (-0.15) (-0.77) (-0.12) (-0.21) (-0.45) 
Prior_RET 0.024* -0.003 0.043** -0.010** 0.043** -0.010** 0.045** -0.010** 
 
(1.65) (-1.60) (2.28) (-2.14) (2.48) (-2.05) (2.34) (-2.17) 
AGE 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 
(1.19) (0.49) (-0.17) (-1.28) (0.01) (-1.49) (0.10) (-1.36) 
RND 0.000 -0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.001 -0.003 
 
(0.01) (-0.83) (0.10) (-0.95) (0.17) (-1.08) (0.08) (-1.09) 
MAG_AR 0.855** 0.006 0.943*** -0.006 0.857*** 0.012 0.959*** -0.006 
 
(2.09) (0.28) (2.86) (-0.06) (2.72) (0.13) (2.93) (-0.06) 
ANALYST -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
 
(-0.75) (0.85) (-1.28) (0.80) (-1.29) (0.69) (-1.24) (0.78) 
IOHOLD 0.011 -0.002 -0.008 -0.012** -0.007 -0.011** -0.005 -0.012** 
 
(0.67) (-1.29) (-0.48) (-2.08) (-0.48) (-2.06) (-0.31) (-2.06) 
FSINFORM -0.077*** 0.002 -0.062*** 0.002 -0.057*** 0.002 -0.062*** 0.002 
 
(-4.47) (1.60) (-4.02) (0.75) (-4.24) (0.75) (-4.10) (0.73) 
RET_VOL 1.471** 0.163 1.581*** 0.469** 1.463*** 0.378* 1.351** 0.484** 
 
(2.53) (1.43) (2.65) (2.04) (2.76) (1.76) (2.28) (2.11) 
Constant 0.004 -0.001 -0.039 0.005 -0.005 0.007 -0.069 0.012 
 
(0.04) (-0.25) (-0.66) (0.50) (-0.09) (0.67) (-0.91) (1.05) 
         Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 14,921 14,921 17,952 17,952 20,323 20,323 17,884 17,884 
Adjusted R2 0.008 0.006 0.008 0.005 0.009 0.005 0.009 0.005 
                  
This table reports the regression results of the relation between tax avoidance and the profitability of insider trades, 
after controlling for corporate social responsibility orientation (CSR). The detailed definitions of the variables are 
provided in the Appendix. T-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Standard errors 
are corrected for cross-sectional and time-series dependence (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010). ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level or better, respectively (two-tailed test).  
 
 
 
